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Abstract: 
We assess the quality of opening and closing prices for Nasdaq stocks by examining the effect 
that opening and closing call auctions (introduced in 2004) have had on price formation. Our 
use of measurement intervals of one minute or less sharpens the picture of intra-day volatility 
accentuations: they are concentrated within the first two minutes after the open and the last 
minute prior to the close, with the overall pattern being stapleshaped rather than U-shaped. 
We find that Nasdaq’s calls have reduced this volatility, reorganized order flow, and lowered 
volatility persistence. Opening and closing prices had previously contained appreciable 
transitory components which have been dampened by Nasdaq’s market structure innovation. 
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 The Quality of Price Formation at Market Openings and 
Closings: Evidence from the Nasdaq Stock Market 
1. Introduction
The quality of price formation at equity market openings and closings is of major 
importance to market participants, listed companies, regulators, academic researchers, 
and securities exchange operators because of the various uses to which they are put.
Following the arrival of overnight news, opening prices are the first reflections of the 
mood of the market at the start of a new trading day.  Closing prices are used for a variety 
of legal valuation purposes, for marking-to-market, for converting mutual fund inflows 
(withdrawals) into fund holdings (cash), and for derivative settlements (e.g., options for 
individual shares and ETF options expire using closing prices).
1  Further, closing prices 
provide important performance benchmarks for institutional traders, and are commonly 
used for academic research on stock returns.  
The importance that the financial community places on having appropriately set 
opening and closing prices, and the difficulty of achieving them, are evidenced by the 
pressures that led Nasdaq to introduce a major structural change in its marketplace: in 
2004 it instituted two call auctions that it refers to as the “Opening Cross” and the 
“Closing Cross.”  Along with assessing the quality of opening and closing prices, we 
consider the effect that these auctions have had as price-setting devices at these two 
critically important moments of the trading day.   
Our assessment of the quality of opening and closing prices focuses primarily on 
their transitory components.  A price change is “transitory” if it occurs due to 
microstructure factors such as bid-ask spreads, market impact, price discreteness, and 
non-instantaneous price discovery.  In contrast, a price change is “permanent” if it is 
attributable to a change in the underlying efficient price. Fully efficient prices are not 
empirically observable, but it is well known that transitory effects can contribute 
significantly to price volatility in short measurement intervals.  As such, the magnitude of 
transitory volatility can be controlled by superior market structure design and, 
1 Some derivative contracts (e.g., the S&P 500 financial futures contract) settle based on the opening price 
instead of the closing price. 
1accordingly, we can draw inferences on price efficiency by examining the impact of a 
market structure change on price volatility   The approach is complementary to 
Hasbrouck (1993) who has presented an econometric procedure for decomposing the 
permanent and transitory components of price changes. 
We are able to implement our methodology because of Nasdaq’s very significant 
market structure change.  Our analysis sheds light on both the magnitude of opening and 
closing transitory volatility, and on the efficacy of a call auction as a price-setting 
mechanism.  As we discuss in Section 3, prior research on call auctions has yielded 
divergent conclusions about a call’s effect on market quality.
2  Accordingly, along with 
obtaining further insight into the importance of transitory factors at market openings and 
closings, we seek additional understanding of the efficiency properties of call auction 
trading.
With the exception of Kandel, Rindi, and Bosetti (2008), who used one-minute 
measurement intervals, prior research has assessed volatility over intervals that, because 
of their length (commonly 15 or 30 minutes), makes it difficult to discern whether 
accentuated volatility is attributable to matters pertaining to the opening and closing per 
se, or to some other attribute of the continuous market.  For this reason, we analyze the 
ultra-short measurement intervals (i.e., one-minute and ten-seconds) that immediately 
follow market openings and which immediately precede market closings.  These ultra-
brief intervals are characterized by large trading volume and high volatility.  Targeting 
these intervals directly gives us a sharper assessment of opening and closing pricing 
efficiency.
Using these ultra-fine measurement intervals, we find that, prior to the Nasdaq 
market structure innovation, opening and closing prices reflected substantial volatility 
that could be attributable to microstructure factors.  We also observe that opening and 
closing volatility decreased appreciably after Nasdaq instituted its two calls.  These 
results indicate that: 1) opening and closing prices previously had contained sizable 
transitory components, and 2) Nasdaq’s market structure innovation has improved the 
2 For example, findings by Hillion and Souminen (2000), Smith (2007), Kandel, Rindi, and Bosetti (2008), 
among others, suggest that a call’s introduction can improve market quality by reducing intra-day volatility.  
However, Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005), and Chakraborty, Pagano, and Schwartz (2008) identify potential 
coordination and communication problems associated with call auctions which can lead to poorer market 
quality. 
2quality of opening and closing prices.  In addition, we find that the U-shaped intra-day 
volatility pattern typically observed in half-hour data is largely driven by the first two 
minutes after the open and the final minute prior to the close.  Thus, the intra-day 
volatility pattern more closely resembles a “staple” rather than a U-shape.
3
We sought confirmation that the two Nasdaq calls enhanced market quality by 
assessing comparable volatility changes for a matched sample of New York Stock 
Exchange stocks.  The NYSE stocks showed no consistent pattern of volatility 
reductions. This contrast between the two securities markets suggests that the volatility 
reductions for the Nasdaq stocks were not attributable to other exogenous factors that 
could have systematically changed volatility levels across stocks. 
Our empirical analysis covers two months (February 2004 and February 2005) 
that bracket the introduction of both the opening and the closing Nasdaq calls.  Our main 
findings are: 
1) The three most volatile minutes in a trading day are the two minutes following the 
open and the final minute preceding the close.   
2) Nasdaq’s opening and closing calls have significantly reduced volatility in the 
neighborhood of the open and the close.
3) The auctions concentrated the opening volatility closer to the first minute, while 
volatility was reduced overall at the close.
4) The correlation between overnight volatility (the absolute value of the overnight 
return) and opening volatility (volatility over the first several minutes) was 
reduced after the calls were instituted.  This suggests decreased volatility 
persistence and improved efficiency of price discovery for Nasdaq-listed stocks.
4
3 This pattern suggests that studies of intra-day volatility and return patterns do not need to discard the first 
and last half-hour of trading data (as is frequently done in certain areas of asset pricing and market 
microstructure research).  Instead, all data except those associated with the very first and last few minutes 
of trading can be used. 
4 As we discuss later, the quality of price discovery can be measured by the correlation between overnight 
return volatility and opening volatility.  Because it typically takes some amount of time for the market to 
process information that arrives during the overnight period, a positive correlation can exist between 
overnight return volatility and volatility during the opening minutes.  A superior opening and closing 
mechanism that allows the opening and closing prices to be set more efficiently should decrease the 
volatility correlation.  That is, this correlation should become closer to zero.   
35) The calls induced a re-organization of order flow, with a significant jump in 
trading volume occurring primarily in the opening period as the new market 
structure drew order flow from pre-open trading. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the pressures that led 
Nasdaq to institute its calls, Section 3 summarizes prior evidence on a call auction’s 
effect on the quality of opening and closing prices, and Section 4 sets forth our 
hypotheses.  Section 5 describes our data, while Section 6 contains the analysis and 
empirical results.  Section 7 concludes.  The stocks included in the analysis are listed in 
Appendix 1, Nasdaq’s Closing Cross procedure is described in Appendix 2, and 
robustness tests based on a matched sample of New York Stock Exchange stocks are 
reported in Appendix 3. 
2. The Pressures That Led Nasdaq to Institute its Calls 
The forces that led Nasdaq to introduce its two Crosses underscore the importance 
that the financial community places on having appropriately set opening prices, and the 
difficulty of achieving them.  A number of prominent participants in the Nasdaq 
marketplace had clearly perceived the problem of inefficient pricing at the open and at 
the close before the two Nasdaq calls were introduced, and the company was increasingly 
being pressured by various voices in the industry to “clean up” these prices.  As early as 
May 16, 2000, Arthur Levitt, then-chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in a letter to Frank Zarb, then chairman and chief executive officer of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, wrote, “I urge the NASD to pursue a unified 
opening procedure, and in the interim, to press forward with measures to make the 
opening process more reliable and fair to investors.”  On the other hand, the NASD was 
also meeting staunch resistance from its dealer community which felt threatened by the 
innovation.
In Fall 2003, Nasdaq finally decided to introduce a closing call.  The critical 
factor that led it to do so was that a competing market, the American Stock Exchange, 
responding to a strongly expressed request from Standard & Poor’s for better closing 
prices, started planning a closing call of its own that would be used for Nasdaq stocks.
Another consideration at the time was the need to handle the extremely heavy trading 
4volume that was expected for the upcoming rebalancing of the Russell 2000 index on 
June 25, 2004.  This annual event had the potential to generate extreme volatility at the 
close in nearly 1,700 Nasdaq stocks by funds seeking to track the Russell index.
Accordingly, Nasdaq accelerated its introduction of Closing Cross, and it succeeded in 
achieving the goal.
5
3. Market Structure and the Quality of Opening and Closing Prices 
For over two decades, equity exchanges around the globe have been experiencing 
enormous structural change and the broad topic of how market structure affects stock 
return and risk measures has received much attention in the microstructure literature.
6
Because they are now being widely used around the world to open and to close equity 
markets, electronic call auctions in particular are an important trading facility to study.
7
Nevertheless, evidence of their effect on market quality has been subject to some 
question, and interest in them has continued in the microstructure literature.  Nasdaq, by 
introducing its opening and closing calls in 2004, has given us an excellent opportunity to 
assess the effect that a call auction can have on the quality of prices.  In essence, we are 
testing a joint hypothesis: that opening and closing prices do reflect transitory 
inefficiency, and that the call auction has mitigated this inefficiency.
8
Opening prices may be affected by transitory inefficiency because the opening is 
a time when overnight news is processed by the market and translated into new share 
values, and price discovery is perceived to be a protracted, noisy process.  Closing prices 
5 For further discussion, see Pagano and Schwartz (2005).  We have been advised by Nasdaq that their own 
internal studies have indicated that the crosses have dampened price volatility at the open and the close.  
Further, the Closing Cross has successfully handled extremely high volume at times of particularly stress 
(e.g., at the Russell June rebalancings).  As reported in Smith (2006), in the period from mid-June 2004 to 
the end of December 2004, trading volume for most days was between 3 and 8 million shares, while at the 
June 25 Russell 2000 rebalancing, 333 million shares were crossed. 
6 Most strikingly, electronic order-driven platforms have come to the fore and human-intermediated floor-
based systems and dealer markets have dwindled in importance. 
7 The New York Stock Exchange opens trading with a call auction that is run by the Exchange specialists 
and it is not fully electronic. 
8 As the measurement intervals decrease, the transitory component’s contribution to total volatility 
increases relative to the permanent component’s contribution.  Therefore, any diminution of total volatility, 
measured over ultra-fine intervals, that is attributable to a change in market structure would reflect a 
reduction in its transitory component. 
5may be affected by transitory inefficiency because the closing is a time when traders, 
feeling increasing pressure to “get the job done,” speed up their order entry and, in so 
doing, cause price dislocations and accentuated volatility.  Further, the use of market on 
close (MOC) and limit on close (LOC) orders by participants seeking to execute at 
market closing prices exactly can cause pricing disruptions.
Presumably, the quality of price setting at openings and closings can be improved 
by superior market design.  Market structure affects the way in which orders are 
coordinated (i.e., how they are turned into executed trades and transaction prices), and 
order coordination is accomplished differently in continuous and call auction trading.  In 
continuous trading, orders are matched according to the sequence in which they have 
arrived at the market, trades are typically bi-lateral, and transaction prices are generally 
distributed over a (potentially wide) range of price points during even relatively brief 
time intervals.  In contrast, with call auction trading, orders are batched together for 
simultaneous execution in a single trade that is generally multi-lateral, and all matching 
and crossing orders execute at a single price.  If the sequence of order arrivals over a brief 
time period is not economically meaningful, we expect that the multiplicity of prices in 
continuous trading will reflect more transitory noise than the single price that would be 
set in a call auction.
9,10
A number of academic studies have shown that price volatility is accentuated at 
the start and at the close of a trading day.
11  This accentuation indicates the existence of 
9 When trades are separated by only seconds (or less), the actual sequence in which they occur can itself be 
perturbed by the vagaries of order formation and entry (including the relative speed with which the 
decisions of different participants are made and their orders are transmitted to the market).  In this context, 
the sequence of transaction prices, consolidated over different trading venues and recorded over very short 
intervals, might be influenced more by random factors and less by any economically meaningful effects.  
10  For an early discussion of the attributes and efficiency properties of call auction trading, see Economides 
and Schwartz (1995).  
11 For empirical evidence of the U-shaped intra-day volatility pattern, see Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985), 
Harris (1986), Lockwood and Linn (1990), and Ozenbas, Schwartz and Wood (2002).  Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) provide some theoretical rationales for this observed 
pattern, such as the costs a market maker faces due to differences in public versus private information, as 
well as the risks of holding an inventory of risky assets.  In addition, Paroush, Schwartz, and Wolf (2007) 
suggests that, particularly at market openings, transaction prices can be perturbed and cause intra-day 
fluctuations in volatility due to divergent expectations (i.e., investors “agree to disagree” on the value of a 
risky asset). 
6pricing dislocations, and it has been suggested in the microstructure literature that the call 
auction arrangement has the potential to ameliorate this inefficiency.  A single price call 
auction concentrates multiple buyers and sellers at specific points in time, a procedure 
that can lead to enhanced liquidity and improved price discovery.
12  Hillion and 
Souminen (2000), Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2005), Pagano and Schwartz (2003, 
2005), and Smith (2007) all support the view that call auctions improve the quality of 
openings and/or closings.
13  Kandel, Rindi, and Bosetti’s (2008) examination of the 
Borsa Italiana’s closing call auction yields results that are consistent with our findings: 
the Borsa’s closing call, like the two Nasdaq calls, attracted a sizable portion of trading 
volume, and it also significantly reduced the bid-ask spread and volatility in the final 
minute of continuous trading.
14
A different light is shed on the matter, however, by Ellul, Shin, and Tonks’s 
(2005) contrast of call and dealer market mechanisms.  These authors’ empirical analysis 
of trading on the London Stock Exchange suggests that the call “suffers from a high 
failure rate to open and close trading especially when trading conditions are difficult” (p. 
779).  The difficult conditions cited by these authors include asymmetric information, 
slow trading, and price uncertainty.  Briefly stated, these marketplace realities can result 
in what Ellul et al. (2005) refer to as the “coordination motives for trading.”  Namely, 
participants who would otherwise be willing to trade with each other will hold their 
12 For more details on the costs and benefits of call auctions see Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005) and the 
references therein, particularly Bacidore and Lipson (2001), Madhavan (1992), Domowitz and Madhavan 
(2001), and Pagano (1989). 
13 In each of these studies, the exchange operator (the Nasdaq Stock Market for all of the studies except the 
Pagano and Schwartz, 2003, and Hillion and Souminen, 2000, studies which focus on Euronext-Paris) 
introduced a call auction to open and/or to close trading.  Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2005) study the 
impact of Nasdaq’s introduction of an opening call auction on particularly stressful days (i.e., on “triple 
witching” days where stock index futures and options, as well as individual stock options, expire).  Similar 
to what Pagano and Schwartz (2003, 2005) found for the introduction of an electronic closing call auction 
at Euronext-Paris and the Nasdaq Stock Market, respectively, Barclay et al. (2005) observe that the opening 
calls did significantly improve market efficiency.  Smith (2007) corroborates the Pagano and Schwartz 
(2005) finding that market quality improved following the introduction of Nasdaq’s Closing Call.   
14 Madhavan and Panchapagesan’s (2000) study of the opening price mechanism at the NYSE establishes 
that specialist activities can improve the quality of the opening price.   Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999), and 
Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2000) analyze pre-opening behavior at Euronext-Paris and Nasdaq, 
respectively; both find that pre-opening activity (e.g., providing indicative bids and offers) is informative 
and can improve a market’s quality at its openings.  Barclay and Hendershott (2003) report similar 
improvements in market quality attributable to pre-open and post-close trading activity over the full 24-
hour day. 
7orders back if they believe that others will also be holding back (for the same reason).  
Chakraborty, Pagano, and Schwartz’s (2008) theoretical analysis of order submission to a 
call auction yields a similar result.  Chakraborty et al. further suggest, however, that a 
call’s success can depend critically on its structure (whether or not it is transparent, and 
whether or not it includes intermediaries whose role is to “animate” the market, et cetera). 
  Based on the above discussion, one can conclude, as Kandel, Rindi and Bosetti 
(2008) also state, that the evidence on the efficiency of call auction trading is not 
definitive, and that further assessment is important.  In particular, it remains an open 
question as to how the introduction of Nasdaq’s opening and closing calls have affected 
price discovery, intra-day volatility, and trading volume.  We gain further insight into the 
issue by our treatment of ultra-fine measurement intervals (one minute and ten-second 
periods) and through the comprehensive set of indicators that we examine (volatility, 
volatility persistence, inter-temporal return correlations, and volume effects). 
4.  Hypotheses Tested 
While econometric procedures can be used to capture the transitory component of 
opening and closing prices (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1993), a complementary approach is to 
assess the effect that a market structure change such as Nasdaq’s institution of its two 
calls has had on total volatility.  Presumably, any diminution of total volatility that is 
attributable to the introduction of the two Nasdaq calls would reflect a reduction in its 
transitory component if the time interval chosen for the analysis is brief enough so that 
the transitory component’s contribution to total volatility is high relative to the permanent 
component’s contribution. 
We examine the impact that Nasdaq’s innovation has had on the informational 
efficiency of prices as reflected in price volatility, volatility persistence, and return 
correlation.  In so doing, we first focus on the accentuation of opening and closing 
volatility relative to mid-day volatility, and then assess the success that Nasdaq’s two 
calls have had in containing this accentuation.  We use two volatility measures: 1) a high-
low price range within an interval (the difference between the highest and the lowest 
prices in the interval) divided by the average price over the interval, and 2) a relative 
range measure, which is the ratio of the range for the opening (or closing) intervals to the 
8mid-day range.  Relative range controls for differences in volatility across firms and over 
time.  To assess further the efficiency of price discovery, we examine the correlation 
between overnight and opening volatilities, as well between short-period, end-of-day 
returns and overnight returns.  We compare these correlations (along with volatility and 
volume measures) across the months of February 2004 and February 2005.  
Specifically, we formulate and test the following three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. Nasdaq’s Opening and Closing Crosses reduced volatility 
accentuations in the immediate neighborhood of the opening and closing for 
Nasdaq-listed stocks.  If the crosses have improved market quality, then we 
should see a reduction in volatility at and near market openings and closings 
relative to base levels of volatility.   
Hypothesis 2. The Nasdaq Opening and Closing Crosses have improved the 
efficiency of price discovery for trading in Nasdaq-listed stocks.
To test this hypothesis, we analyze the correlation between overnight and opening 
volatility.  If Hypothesis 2 is correct, we would expect opening and closing prices 
to be set more efficiently and, therefore, for overnight information to have less of 
an effect on volatility during the following day’s opening minutes.  We also 
assess the correlation between closing returns (the price change from 3:59 pm to 
the time of the close) and overnight returns.  If a price is perturbed at the close, 
the dislocation should be ameliorated in the subsequent opening price.  In short, 
any reduction in volatility persistence and in return reversal behavior would be 
supportive of this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. The Opening Cross attracted order flow from the continuous 
market, especially from pre-opening trading, and from the first minutes of the 
trading day.  A similar re-organization of the order flow is not necessarily 
expected at the closing for two reasons: the continuous trading environment that 
precedes the open is less efficient than that which precedes the close, and there is 
9no appreciable trading after the close from which to draw order flow.
15  To assess 
this re-organization of the order flow, we analyze trading volume and the number 
of trades during sub-periods around the open and the close. 
  We test these hypotheses using Nasdaq data, and confirm our findings by running 
comparable tests on a matched sample of New York Stock Exchange firms.  Observing 
systematic changes for the Nasdaq firms but not for the NYSE firms suggests that the 
Nasdaq findings are not attributable to other market wide factors.  
5. The Data 
Using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), we selected 
the 110 largest Nasdaq companies based on their market capitalization at the end of 2003.
Because of the very brief intra-day time spans that we employ, our empirical analysis 
focuses on only the largest Nasdaq firms; for our purposes, smaller firms do not generally 
generate sufficient trading activity within these fine moments of time.   
We construct a weekly return volatility measure, Retstd (using prices from each 
Wednesday close to each following Wednesday close) based on returns for the months of 
February 2003 through January 2004.  We matched the list of Nasdaq companies with 
NYSE companies using the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.  Our matching 
variables are equity market capitalization and weekly return volatility.  This yielded a 
final sample of 104 companies with available data during the months of February 2004 
and February 2005.  The average market capitalization of the Nasdaq sample ranges from 
$3.5 billion for the smallest 20 firms to $65.7 billion for the largest 20 firms.  The 
symbols for the Nasdaq and NYSE firms are given in Appendix 1, and the robustness test 
results for the matched sample of NYSE stocks are reported in Appendix 3.
The months of February 2004 and February 2005 were chosen because they allow a 
reasonable amount of time before the Closing Cross’s introduction on March 29, 2004, 
and after the Opening Cross’s implementation was completed on December 13, 2004.  
15  The attraction of order flow to both calls may be somewhat muted, however for two reasons: 1) Nasdaq 
displays indicated clearing prices during the bookbuilding process that precedes each of the calls, which 
gives participants transparent reference prices to trade at, and 2) in the ten minutes preceding each cross, 
standard market and limit orders are not permitted and only imbalance orders (sell orders priced higher than 
the 4:00 pm closing price, and buy orders priced lower) are permitted.  We describe the Closing Cross in 
more detail in Appendix 2. 
10That is, the February 2004 data enable us to examine trading activity at least one month 
prior to both the closing and the opening calls’ introductions, and the February 2005 data 
provide adequate time after the events for market participants to learn how best to utilize 
both of the new call auctions’ capabilities.  Also, comparing the same month (February) 
across the two years controls for possible seasonality in trading activity that could have 
occurred at the Nasdaq Stock Market.  Fortuitously, overall market volatility was similar 
for these two months (the CRSP value weighted daily return volatility was 0.63 percent 
in February 2004 and 0.66 percent in February 2005).
We obtain trade and quote information for the 390 1-minute intervals of the trading 
day (9:30-16:00), the thirty 10-second intervals of the opening five minutes (9:30-9:35), 
and the thirty 10-second intervals of the closing five minutes (15:55:00-16:00:00).
16  For 
each interval, we compute the highest, the lowest, and the average prices.  When 
transaction prices are not available, we use the highest and the lowest mid-quote, and 
replace the average trade price with the average mid-quote price.  Stock return volatility 
is measured (in basis points) by the percentage high-low price range (Range), which we 
define as the difference between the highest and the lowest prices, relative to the average 
price during the interval.
17
To control further for differences in return volatility across firms and over time, and 
to focus on the intra-day changes in return volatility, we also constructed the variable 
“relative range” (R_Range).  For each day and each stock, we compute the average mid-
day range over all of the mid-day intervals between 10:30-15:00.
18  The relative ranges 
for the opening (or closing) intervals are then computed as the ratio of the range for the 
opening (or closing) intervals to the mid-day range. 
16  Nasdaq has advised us that reporting delays for conventional trades rarely exceed 5 seconds.  Trades 
executed later in the day by market makers at earlier, pre-arranged prices such as “Sold Sales” on the 
NYSE and “Prior Reference Price” trades on the Nasdaq system are omitted from our analysis, as these 
transaction prices would distort the ultra short-term volatility estimates. 
17 Range vis-à-vis absolute returns can more accurately capture the volatility that Nasdaq’s crosses are 
designed to reduce.  Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) and Brandt and Diebold (2006) show that the 
range-based volatility estimator is highly efficient and approximately Gaussian.   
18 To ensure a cleaner break between the opening and closing half-hour periods and the mid-day period, we 
do not include the second half-hour and the second-to-last half-hour in our computation of the latter. 
.
11The variable Spread, measured in basis points, is the average of the actual quoted 
spreads divided by the average price during the interval.  The variable Numtrades
captures the total number of trades during the interval.  The variable Avgtdsize is defined 
as the share trading volume divided by the number of trades during the interval.  Similar 
to the construction of R_Range, we compute R_Spread, R_Numtrades, and R_Avgtdsize
for the opening and closing intervals as the ratios of Spread, Numtrades, and Avgtdsize to
their corresponding mid-day levels, respectively. 
6. Analysis and Results 
6.1  The intra-day volatility pattern 
As noted, it is widely documented that intra-day return volatility for common 
stocks describes a U-shaped pattern (i.e., the first and the last thirty minutes of trading 
exhibit elevated levels of volatility relative to that observed during the middle of the 
trading day).  We probe deeper into this pattern by examining volatility behavior within 
the first and the last 30-minute periods.
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Figure 1 shows the average volatility (Range) across the Nasdaq stocks for one-
minute intervals during February 2004 (Panel A) and February 2005 (Panel B).  To 
obtain this figure, we first calculate the mean volatility measures of Range over the 
nineteen trading days, for each of the two months, for each stock and each time interval.  
We then also calculate, for each of the two months, the cross-sectional median of the 
mean volatility for each individual stock and for each time interval.  In both months, 
volatility describes a roughly staple-shaped pattern.. What is most striking is that the first 
and the last five minutes of trading exhibit volatility levels that are several times higher 
than those observed for the other intervals in the trading day. 
19 There are other ways to measure intra-day returns and volatility.  For example, Aït-Sahalia, Mykland, 
and Zhang (2005), and Bandi and Russell (2006) examine high-frequency (i.e., intra-day) data to identify 
the optimal time intervals to measure short-term returns so that one can efficiently decompose observed 
returns into two sub-components: one related to changes in the asset’s “fundamentals” (efficient volatility) 
and the other attributable to microstructure “noise.”   Bandi and Russell’s (2006) decomposition procedure, 
however, would yield only two values per day for each stock (the fundamental/efficient volatility and the 
microstructure noise volatility) whereas we require numerous minute and sub-minute volatility measures 
for each day.  In addition, these approaches ignore the intra-day “seasonality” in volatility, a main focus of 
our paper. 
12We construct a volatility ratio that enables us to contrast the standardized 
importance of volatility over a sequence of one-minute intervals in the opening and 
closing periods.  Specifically, in keeping with Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys 
(2003), we construct realized volatility measures for the first one-minute interval through 
the thirtieth one-minute interval, and for the thirtieth-to-last one-minute interval through 
the last one-minute interval as follows:
20
¦
 
 
n
i
i n Range RV
1
2
Where n corresponds to 1, …, 30.  We then define a volatility ratio,
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where N denotes the longer period.  Ration,N shows the percentage of volatility for the N-
minute period that is accounted for by the first n minutes of that longer interval. 
The volatility ratio for both the opening and the closing minutes are shown in 
Table 1.  The column labeled “Mean” under the “Volatility Ratio” heading of Table 1 
shows that, on average, the volatility estimate for the first minute of trading is 42.3% of 
the total volatility measured over the first five minutes, and is 17.7% of the estimated 
volatility over the first half-hour of trading (these values are reported for the Opening 
period rows labeled as Ratio1/5 and Ratio1/30, respectively).  The volatility measured over 
the first five minutes of trading is 39.9% of the first half-hour estimate (Ratio5/30).
Similarly, for the closing minutes, the last minute of trading is 51.3% of the final five-
minute volatility measure, and is 20.4% of the final half-hour volatility (Ratio1/5 and 
20 Andersen et al. (2003) show formally that the concept of realized variance (measured with high 
frequency intra-day return data) is, according to the theory of quadratic variation and under suitable 
conditions, an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the integrated variance and thus it is a canonical and 
natural measure of return volatility.  Note that since we use range as the volatility measure for our main 
analysis later, the realized variance measures are constructed using the range instead of high frequency 
returns.  The purpose here is to estimate, albeit approximately, the contribution of the opening minutes’ 
range to the first five-minute and 30-minute ranges. 
21 Note that this volatility ratio differs from that first suggested by Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) and Lo 
and MacKinlay (1988), where the ratio of longer to shorter period volatility was designed to reflect the 
correlation structure in returns.  Stoll and Whaley (1990) also use a relative variance ratio which they apply 
to open-to-open and close-to-close daily returns in order to study the impact of the NYSE opening process 
on market quality. 
13Ratio1/30, respectively, for the Closing period rows).  Lastly, the estimated volatility for 
the final five minutes is 36.6% of the final half-hour volatility (Ratio5/30).
In light of the magnitude of volatility in the opening and closing minutes of 
trading, we examine yet shorter measurement intervals.  Figure 2 focuses on Range
during the opening and closing 10-second intervals in the opening and closing five 
minutes of trading.  We again see that volatility successively spikes up through the sub-
minute intervals that are successively closer to either the open or the close.   
These relatively brief time intervals contribute significantly to the opening and 
closing period volatility.  They are also economically important, given the proportionate 
amount of trading that occurs during these volatile moments in the trading day.  The 
median contribution to trading volume for the first two minutes of continuous trading 
(9:30-9:32) is 50% of the total volume for the first five minutes of trading, and 25% of 
the volume during the first 15 minutes.  More strikingly, the final minute of trading 
accounts for 25% of the trading volume during the last five minutes of continuous 
trading.
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Overall, the above results show that the first and the last five-minute volatility 
estimates contribute substantially to the intra-day volatility pattern.  Inefficient price-
setting at the open and the close is suggested by this opening and closing volatility 
because this pattern is more likely to be driven by the transitory components of intra-day 
price movements.  This inference can be confirmed if the volatility accentuation 
decreases after the two calls were introduced.   These brief opening and closing time 
intervals are also economically significant and, accordingly, we focus on them for the 
remainder of the paper. 
6.2  Volatility differences between February 2004 and February 2005 
Figures 1 and 2 provide visual evidence in support of Hypothesis 1: namely, the 
opening and closing volatilities were less in February 2005 compared to February 2004 
(i.e., we choose two periods before and after the two Nasdaq crosses were introduced).
22 In addition, the combined median trading volume during the first and last two minutes of trading 
represents 3.9% of the total volume for the entire trading day in February 2005. 
14We formally test this hypothesis by analyzing the volatility patterns for one-minute and 
ten-second intervals for the opening and closing minutes of trading.  
1. Univariate Comparisons 
Table 2 presents the univariate comparisons of mean and median volatility 
measures during the one-minute intervals of Range and R_Range for Nasdaq stocks 
during February 2004 and February 2005.  For both the mean and median volatilities, the 
differences between these two months were assessed using a t-test and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test, respectively.  Table 2 summarizes the results for the full sample of 104 
Nasdaq firms.
The statistics reported in the table confirm the visual evidence in Figure 1 that the 
volatility measures (Range and R_Range) both decreased from February 2004 to 
February 2005 in both the opening minutes and in the closing minutes of trading.  As 
shown in Table 2, the differences are generally in the expected direction and many are 
statistically significant.  For the first three 1-minute intervals at the market’s open, the 
reductions in the median range are 6.0, 9.1, and 3.8 basis points, respectively, and they 
are all statistically significant at the .01 level.  This translates into 11%, 22%, and 13% 
decreases relative to their corresponding levels in February 2004.  The decreases in 
volatility are most striking for the closing minutes.  For the last five one-minute intervals 
before the close, the declines in the median range are 3.1, 4.2, 4.8, 1.7, and 12.6 basis 
points, respectively, all are statistically significant, and they correspond to 23%, 30%, 
32%, 12%, and 34% decreases relative to their levels in February 2004.  The findings for 
R_Range are very similar to those just noted.  The pattern of reduced volatility after the 
introduction of Nasdaq’s crosses is also robust across different size groups (i.e., the 
largest 20 and the smallest 20 stocks).  Consistently, the magnitude of the volatility 
decline is biggest during the opening and the closing five minutes. 
We investigate the opening and the closing periods more closely by analyzing 
volatility measures for the 10-second intervals within the first five minutes and the last 
five minutes of trading.  Table 3 compares the volatility measures for February 2004 and 
February 2005 for the opening period (Panel A) and for the closing period (Panel B).  For 
the opening intervals, the greatest reduction in the median Range occurs within the first 
15two minutes of the open.  For the closing intervals, the greatest reduction in the median 
Range occurs in the last two minutes before the close.  Unlike the 10-second intervals for 
the opening two minutes (where the intervals within each minute exhibit similar levels of 
volatility), the volatility in the last two 10-second intervals of the closing minute is three 
to five times greater than in the preceding intervals.  After the Nasdaq crosses were 
introduced, the largest volatility reduction occurred within these last two 10-second 
intervals.  This suggests that the volatility spike in the closing seconds of trading in 
particular has been accentuated by participants attempting to transact at the closing price 
exactly, an objective that the call has made less disruptive and considerably easier to 
achieve.
2. Multivariate Analysis 
To control for potential changes in overall market conditions during the sample 
period (other than the implementation of the opening and closing crosses), we perform 
panel regression analyses for the sixty 10-second intervals during the first and the last 
five minutes of the trading day.
23  Table 4 provides summary statistics for the regression 
variables, while Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the opening and the closing 
intervals, respectively.  In both tables, we summarize the coefficient estimates and robust 
standard errors, adjusted for possible firm clustering (the latter are shown in 
parentheses).
24  Overall, the cross-sectional regression models capture a fair amount of 
the variability in the Range and R_range measures, as summarized by the reasonably 
high adjusted R
2 statistics (ranging from .261 to .456 in Tables 5 and 6).  Interestingly, 
the R
2s are appreciably higher for the close than the open. 
We first focus on Range as our volatility measure.  With it, regression model 1 in 
Table 5, Panel A shows that the 10-second volatilities in the first five minutes of trading 
in February 2005 are, on average, 3.75 basis points lower than in February 2004 (as 
23 The number of observations is based on 104 companies times 38 trading days over the two months, times 
30 ten-second intervals, less a small number of intervals lost because of incomplete data. 
24 The results (which are available upon request) remain similar if the robust standard errors are adjusted 
for possible date clustering. 
16shown by the parameter estimate for the after variable in model 1).
25  For the 5-minute 
opening period, the first three minutes (denoted as min1, min2, min3) have significantly 
higher volatility (13.34, 3.50, and 0.63) compared to the last two minutes of the opening 
period (referred to as min4 and min5).  After the Crosses are introduced, model 2 
indicates that the decrease in volatility is significantly greater for intervals during the first 
three minutes – the incremental reductions in volatility (captured by the parameter 
estimates for the min_a1, min_a2, and min_a3 post-Cross dummy variables) are 6.38, 
4.24 and 0.59 bps, respectively.  Regarding the control variables, intra-day volatility 
increases with the spread (measured in basis points), the number of trades, average trade 
size, and a stock’s weekly return volatility.   
Table 5, Panel B summarizes the results using the R_Range volatility measure.  
We find similar volatility reductions for this measure across the five models.  Compared 
to a year earlier, the opening period’s relative range ratio in February 2005 is, on average, 
0.22 less (as shown by the parameter estimate for the after variable in model 1).  The 
value of 0.22 indicates that the 2004 R_Range value of 5.40 (reported for the 9:31-9:32 
time interval in the fourth column of Table 2) was, on average, reduced to 5.18 following 
the introduction of the crosses (all other factors constant). In model 2, the decrease in 
volatility is significantly greater for the first three minutes, and the marginal reductions in 
this relative volatility measure (compared to min4 and min5) are 0.525, 0.422, and 0.065, 
respectively.  In addition, R_Range increases with the spread, the number of trades, 
average trade size, and the weekly return volatility; it also increases with market 
capitalization.
26
25 In interpreting this and other basis point reductions, it is helpful to keep in mind that, e.g., a 3.75 basis 
point reduction translates into a 1.125¢ reduction in price volatility for a $30 stock. 
26 The positive relationship between a stock’s market cap and its return volatility at the open might be due 
to the tendency for large cap stocks to open more quickly and, in so doing, to lead the overall market in 
terms of price discovery at the opening (as observed in Bernhardt and Davies, 2006).  In other words, the 
volatility of larger cap stocks may be higher because these stocks disproportionately carry the burden of 
discovering opening prices, while trading in smaller cap stocks lags behind as investors wait to see how the 
large cap stocks are behaving.  Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) document that retail investors are more 
likely to invest in U.S. stocks with strong brand names while institutional investors are more likely to invest 
in large cap, high beta stocks (and avoid smaller, relatively neglected stocks).  This finding suggests that 
both retail and institutional investors prefer large cap stocks, although for different reasons, and thus the 
volatility of large cap stocks might be relatively high.  Bernhardt and Davies (2006) report that large cap 
stocks’ intra-day returns typically lead those of small cap stocks, possibly due to large cap stocks’ tendency 
to serve as a bellwether for future broad market movements. 
17Table 6 reports the results of a multivariate analysis based on 10-second volatility 
estimates that are similar to those shown in Table 5 at, and leading up to, the close.  To 
capture the relatively large volatility spike in the last two 10-second intervals of the last 
minute, we also incorporate dummy variables that correspond to the final five 10-second 
intervals within the last minute (denoted as sec2 through sec6).
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Table 6, Panel A incorporates regression dummies that account for differences in 
the level of volatility, defined as Range, between February 2004 and February 2005.  The 
parameter estimate for the after variable in model 1 shows that, compared to a year 
earlier, the 10-second interval volatilities within the final five minutes of trading in 
February 2005 are, on average, 1.383 basis points lower.  Compared to the fourth and 
fifth final minutes of trading (referred to here as min4 and min5, or 15:55-15:57), the 
final three 1-minute intervals (min3 – min1) have significantly higher volatility in model 
1 (0.191, 0.715, and 0.832 bps, respectively).  Within the final minute, Range increases 
for each 10-second interval.  Relative to the first 10-second interval of the final minute, 
the subsequent increases in the 10-second interval’s volatility based on model 1 are 
0.367, 0.511, 0.633, 1.250, and 2.199 bps, respectively.  Further, volatility increases with 
the spread, the number of trades, and the weekly return volatility. 
In model 2, the decrease in volatility is significantly greater for intervals during 
the last three minutes of trading: the marginal declines (compared to min(-4) and min(-5)) 
are 0.449, 0.454, and 3.690 bps, respectively.  The decreases are especially large in the 
final minute.  Moreover, within the final minute, volatility decreases the most in the last 
two 10-second intervals.  Relative to the first of the 10-second intervals, model 3 shows 
that the last two 10-second intervals displayed additional decreases of, respectively, 1.240 
and 1.192 bps. 
Using R_Range as an alternative relative volatility measure, Table 6, Panel B 
summarizes the regression results for the closing 5-minute period.  Similar to the results 
shown in Panel A, with regard to the market structure change, regression model 1 shows 
that the 10-second interval closing volatility ratio in February 2005 is, on average, 0.124 
27 As can be seen in Figure 2, there is a sharp, sudden spike in volatility right before the close whereas the 
behavior of the sub-minute volatility estimates following the open is more gradual in nature.  Thus, the 
empirical specification for the closing volatility regressions reported in Table 6 explicitly controls for these 
differences by including the sub-minute dummy variables, sec2 through sec6.
18lower than its comparable February 2004 value.  Moreover, the decrease in volatility is 
significantly greater for intervals during the last three minutes and, based on model 2, the 
marginal reductions in the R_Range ratio (compared to min(-4) and min(-5)) are 0.027, 
0.067, and 0.337, respectively.  The declines in this volatility measure are especially large 
during the final minute.  Additionally, within the final minute, the largest decreases are 
observed during the last three 10-second intervals.  Relative to the first 10-second 
interval, model 3 indicates that the relative volatility ratio during the final three 10-
second intervals showed additional decreases of 0.042, 0.117 and 0.059, respectively. 
In summary, our regression results clearly support Hypothesis 1, that the opening 
and closing crosses dampened the volatility accentuation that previously characterized 
Nasdaq’s openings and closings.  Our observation that superior market design has 
reduced the volatility accentuation strongly suggests that opening and closing prices had 
previously reflected considerably more transitory components.   
6.3 The efficiency of price discovery
It typically takes some time for a market to process information that arrives 
during the overnight period.  Therefore, the opening price may not fully incorporate the 
effect of the overnight information on prices, and it may take minutes or longer for prices 
to attain “equilibrium levels” after the open.  This delay in price discovery would lead to 
a positive correlation between overnight return volatility and volatility during the opening 
minutes.  With regard to the efficiency of closing prices, any distortion at the close that is 
reversed at the open would cause returns measured at the close (e.g., from 3:59 pm to the 
close) to be negatively correlated with the overnight return.  In this subsection, we 
examine the call auctions’ effect on the quality of opening and closing prices as reflected 
in both volatility and return correlations.
1. Correlations between Overnight and Opening Volatility 
More overnight information causes larger overnight returns (in absolute terms), which 
could also lead to greater return volatility in the opening minutes of the following trading 
day.  A superior market opening and closing mechanism that enables opening and closing 
prices to be set more efficiently should sharpen price discovery at these times and, in so 
19doing, decrease volatility in the continuous market that immediately follows the open.  
Turning to Hypothesis 2, we therefore expect the correlation between the overnight return 
volatility and volatility during the following day’s opening minutes to be lower after the 
two Nasdaq crosses were instituted.
Table 7, Panel A displays the correlation between the overnight return volatility 
and the following day’s opening volatility.  As shown in the last column of this panel, the 
correlation of the overnight return volatility with the average volatility of the 1-minute 
intervals during the first five minutes of trading decreases from +0.26 in February  2004 
to +0.19 in February 2005.  The two correlations are significantly different with a p-value 
of 0.046.
28  This decrease is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which states that, after the 
introduction of the two crosses, opening prices are discovered more efficiently, which 
places less stress on price discovery during the first five minutes after the open.   
In Table 7, Panels B through D, we present the correlation results for sub-samples 
ranked by market capitalization (in descending size order).  From these sub-samples, it is 
clear that the correlation result is driven by the 20 largest firms, for which there is a 
significant decline in correlation between the overnight return volatility and the average 
five-minute opening volatility.  The correlation between the overnight volatility and the 
average range during the first minute, range1, drops from a statistically significant 
+0.516 to a statistically insignificant -0.028 after the closing call’s introduction.  In 
contrast, the serial correlation between these volatilities is significantly higher in 2005 for 
the smaller size groups.  This size-related disparity could occur if, with the calls in place, 
the largest cap stocks take a stronger leadership role in price discovery; we conjecture 
that this can result in smaller cap stocks delaying trading at the open in order to “wait and 
see” how the general trend for the larger stocks unfolds.
29
 2. Correlations between Closing and Overnight Returns 
28 To compare these two correlation estimates, we first transform the correlation coefficients using the 
Fisher Z-transform (see Papoulis, 1990): Zf = 1/2 * ln( (1+corr) / (1-corr) ).  The difference: z = (Zf1 - Zf2) 
/ ¥( 1/(n1-3) + 1/(n2-3) ), is approximately Standard Normally distributed, where n1 and n2 are the number 
of observations used in computing the two correlations.  We can use this z-value to determine the level of 
significance of the difference between two correlations. 
29 In support of this interpretation, we observe a large spike in volume in the opening call for the large cap 
stocks after the opening call was introduced. 
20We define r1 as the logarithmic return based on the price at 3:59 pm and the 
closing price (which for February 2004 was 4:00 pm and for February 2005 was 4:00 pm 
plus a small interval, delta).   For February 2005, we decompose r1 into two returns: r1a 
(the one-minute return from 3:59-4:00 pm) and r1b (the return from 4:00 pm to the 
official closing price—which is usually determined within the one-minute period, 4:00-
4:01 pm).  For both months, we define r2 as the overnight logarithmic return based on the 
previous day’s closing price and the current day’s opening price).  If the closing volatility 
is at least partly driven by price discovery noise at the close, then this noise component 
should be temporary, and it should be reversed in subsequent trading during the following 
day.
The closing cross should dampen price discovery-related noise if it has provided a 
superior market design.  Superiority should be further reflected in a lessening of any 
negative serial correlation between the closing returns and the subsequent overnight 
returns.  In particular, after the closing cross’s introduction, we expect the correlation 
between r1 and r2 to be a smaller negative number.  The correlation between today’s 
3:59-4:00 pm return and the subsequent overnight return and (corr(r1a, r2)) should also 
be less negative.  In addition, we examine the correlation between today’s 3:59-4:00 pm 
return and the post-4:00 pm closing return (corr (r1a, r1b)) to understand the relation 
between price in the closing cross and the return during the final minute of trading in the 
continuous market.   
The results in Table 8, Panel A for the full sample show that, before the 
implementation of the Nasdaq crosses, the correlation between the final return on a 
trading day and the subsequent overnight return, corr(r1, r2),  is -0.055, and it is 
statistically significant.  This negative correlation is consistent with the closing return 
being influenced by price discovery noise that is temporary and thus corrected by the 
overnight return.  In 2005, corr(r1, r2) is a statistically insignificant -0.043.  Further, the 
2005 correlation between the current today’s 3:59-4:00 return and the subsequent 
overnight return [corr(r1a, r2)] is an insignificant -0.004.  These reductions in the 
overnight correlations indicate weaker reversals between the previous day’s closing 
return and the ensuing overnight return.  The changes in the r1a-r2 correlations display 
21the correct sign although, as can be seen at the bottom of Table 8, Panel A, their pre- and 
post-crossing differences are insignificant.
Table 8, Panels B-D present the results for our three size groups, respectively.
We see that the reduction in the negative correlation is highly statistically significant for 
both the largest and the smallest quintiles (it changes from -0.241 to -0.015 for the 20 
largest firms, and from -0.315 to -0.031 for the smallest 20).  Curiously, however, the 
mid-cap firms (which represent the middle three quintiles of our sample) show a 
significant increase in negative correlation (-0.033 to -0.138). 
In summary, our analysis of the closing return reversals indicates, at least for the 
largest and the smallest Nasdaq firms in our sample, that the closing returns’ correlations 
with overnight returns decreased significantly in absolute value after the two crosses were 
introduced.  The finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that opening and closing price 
discovery for Nasdaq stocks was more efficient after this market structure innovation. 
6.4 The effects on trading activity 
  We next turn to the impact that the Nasdaq crosses have had on trading activity 
around market openings and closings.  Specifically, we examine volume and numtrades
during 1-minute intervals for the 5 minutes preceding the open, for the 25 minutes 
following the open, for the final 25 minutes preceding the close, and for the 5 minutes 
following the close of the continuous market. We do not necessarily expect that the 
overall share volume will have changed appreciably during the opening and closing 
periods.  However, based on the auctions’ potential to concentrate order flow, we do 
expect the crosses to pull in share volume from the continuous market (predominantly 
from the pre-opening period and the minutes immediately following the open, and from 
the five minutes or so immediately preceding the close).  We further expect the total 
number of trades to decrease around the times of the crosses because each auction 
batches what would otherwise have been multiple trades (in the continuous market) into a 
single, large multi-lateral trade. 
Figure 3 provides visual evidence in support of Hypothesis 3: namely, that the 
Opening Cross attracted order flow away from the pre-opening period and the first 
minutes of continuous trading.  Panels A and B of Figure 3 illustrate a clear shift in 
22trading volume toward the time of the Opening Cross.  Panels C and D of this figure 
pertain to order flow during the minutes of continuous trading around the Closing Cross.
Although the Closing Cross attracted greater order flow at the end of the trading day, it 
did not have a dramatic effect on trading activity during the final minutes of continuous 
trading.
To examine the effects of the Nasdaq crosses on trading activity in more detail, 
we replicated the univariate tests shown in Table 2, focusing not on the two volatility 
measures, but on two trading activity variables: average trading volume (volume) and the 
average number of trades (numtrades).  As shown in Table 9, a substantial (and 
statistically significant) decline in the volume and number of trades occurred in the 9:26 
to 9:30 pre-opening period after the Nasdaq crosses were implemented.  Median Nasdaq 
trading volume during 9:30-9:31 rose by 133% (from 5,475 shares to 12,767 shares) after 
the opening call’s introduction, while per-minute median trading volume for the four 
minutes preceding the open showed decreases ranging from 35% to 89%.   This supports 
our belief that the 9:30-9:31 volume spike is attributable to Nasdaq’s opening cross.
The pattern described for the full sample of 104 Nasdaq stocks also applies to the 
20 largest Nasdaq stocks.  The 20 smallest Nasdaq stocks did not show a decline in pre-
opening volume, but did experience a significant increase in volume at the time of the 
opening cross (9:30-9:31).
30
Our results show that the number of trades declined over these early morning 
minutes, which suggests that the Opening Cross successfully concentrated orders into one 
large trade at the open.  The median number of trades during 9:30-9:31 dropped 
significantly from 18.83 in February 2004 to 10.77 in February 2005.  Thus, the opening 
call appears to be doing its intended job of concentrating orders, which sharpens price 
discovery and thereby reduces volatility and the transitory component of opening prices.
Regarding the Closing Cross, Table 9 shows a statistically insignificant rise in median 
volume (4,701 shares or 11.3%) during 16:00-16:01, although the increase is smaller than 
at the open (7,292 shares) and the number of trades did not change significantly.
Nevertheless, this increase in mean volume (from 41,488 shares to 46,169 shares) during 
30 These results are not reported here to conserve space but are available upon request. 
23the minute of the cross (16:00-16:01) suggests that the closing call was also successful in 
concentrating order flow, and that the consolidation has improved the efficiency of the 
closing prices.
The Nasdaq sub-minute results are shown in Table 10.  No meaningful pattern is 
apparent for volume, but the number of trades increased somewhat after the opening 
cross (e.g., for minutes 9:31 through 9:35).  Similarly, except for the last ten seconds 
prior to the close when it spiked substantially, volume is relatively unchanged around the 
close (Table 10, Panel B).  There is weak evidence that the number of trades increased 
prior to the close.
In summary, consistent with Hypothesis 3, the call auctions have re-organized the 
order flow.  This is particularly apparent during the pre-opening period: the sum of all of 
the volume declines in the minutes from 9:25 to 9:30 and from 9:31-9:32 roughly equals 
the increase in share volume during the opening cross minute, 9:30-9:31.
31  At the end of 
the trading day, volume increased in the minute of the Closing Cross, while pre-close 
trading in the continuous market was not significantly altered.  This contrasts with 
Kandel, Rindi, and Bosetti’s (2008) finding for the Borsa Italiana sample that volume 
decreases in the last five minutes of the continuous market. 
Drawing orders and trades into the opening minute could increase price volatility 
in the ensuing minutes to the extent that the market depth in these ensuing minutes is 
lessened.  On the other hand, sharper price discovery at the open could eliminate 
subsequent price adjustments and thus translate into less volatility in the ensuing minutes. 
The fact that volatility decreased in the minutes immediately following the open suggests 
that, on net, market quality has been improved (i.e., the sharper price discovery in the 
cross dominates any possible negative effect of reduced market depth). 
6.5 Robustness check
  To check the robustness of our results, we compared our findings for Nasdaq-
listed firms with a matched sample of NYSE-listed firms.  These results, which are 
31 The 19,782 average share decline shown in Table 9 for the 9:31-9:32 minutes is not statistically 
significant, but because of its sheer magnitude, could have economic importance.  On the other hand, the 
median drop of 13,041 shares during this time period is significant at the .10 level. 
24reported in more detail in Appendix 3, show that the effects found in our Nasdaq stocks 
are not present in the sample of NYSE stocks.  The NYSE sample also displayed 
considerable minute-by-minute variation in the sign, size, and significance of the 
volatility measures; apparently the test statistic is itself inherently volatile.  In contrast, 
the consistency for the Nasdaq sample supports the hypothesis that the Nasdaq volatility 
diminution was due to a single causal factor – its market structure innovation.  We 
conclude that the phenomena described above are specific to Nasdaq stocks and are not 
an artifact of other possible changes in market conditions and/or potential time trends in 
the market environment during our sample period.   
7. Conclusion and Further Discussion 
  Using ultra-fine measurement intervals of ten seconds and one minute, we have 
conducted a targeted analysis of the impact that Nasdaq’s two call auctions have had on 
the informational efficiency of prices at market openings and closings. Substantial trading 
in the neighborhood of the open and the close indicates the economic importance of the 
first and the last minutes of trading, and the high volatility that characterizes these 
moments suggests that opening and closing prices contain considerable transitory 
components.  It is precisely this pricing inefficiency that led several loud voices in the 
industry (the most effective being Standard & Poor’s) to pressure Nasdaq to introduce its 
opening and closing call auctions.
Our empirical evidence strongly supports the claims that any number of market 
participants had been making concerning the quality of price formation at these critical 
times, and we find that the calls did indeed ameliorate the inefficiency.  First and 
foremost, volatility had been high, and the calls brought it down significantly.
More specifically, our major findings are fivefold:
1. The three most volatile minutes of the trading day are the first two minutes 
following the open, and the final minute preceding the close.  This finding 
indicates that the accentuation of intra-day volatility is concentrated within 
relatively brief periods during the day and the intra-day volatility pattern is 
more staple-shaped than U-shaped.
252. The introduction of the opening and closing Nasdaq call auctions (known as 
the Nasdaq Crosses) has significantly reduced volatility at these two critical 
times (as reported in Appendix 3, similar volatility reductions in a matched 
sample of NYSE stocks did not occur).   
3. The Nasdaq Crosses concentrated the day’s opening volatility closer to the 
first minute of continuous trading, and volatility declined overall in the 
neighborhood of the close.
4. The volatility persistence (the correlation between overnight and opening 
minute’s volatility), and the negative correlation between closing and 
overnight returns, both declined in absolute value after the call auctions were 
introduced.  This further suggests that these auctions have increased the 
efficiency of price discovery.
5. Order flow was re-organized following the market structure change: 
economically and statistically significant jumps in trading volume occurred 
during the opening and closing moments of trading. 
Comprehensively viewed, our findings indicate that Nasdaq’s market structure 
innovation has improved the quality of price formation at two particularly important and 
stressful times of the trading day: the market’s open and its close.  These findings are of 
interest to investors and other market participants, along with a broader audience such as 
regulators and academic researchers.
32  Nevertheless, after the two calls were instituted, 
volatility spikes, although reduced, continue to characterize the opening and closing 
minutes of the trading day.  Apparently the call auctions, while having a beneficial 
impact on market quality, are not a complete panacea, and opening and closing prices 
most likely continue to reflect transient components.  If so, further market structure 
innovation (including improvements in the design of the calls themselves) remains 
desirable.  In the meantime, both practitioners and academic researchers should interpret 
32 For example, the improvement in market quality due to the calls’ introduction suggests that regulators 
might prefer to have markets open and close with calls because these auctions can lead to fewer instances 
of market manipulation.  Academicians who pursue asset pricing and/or market microstructure research can 
also benefit from our finding that the accentuation in price volatility is concentrated within the first 1-2 
minutes immediately following the open and preceding the close.  Our results suggest that researchers 
could use nearly all of the data during a trading day (e.g., that they need not discard the first and last half-
hour of trading data, as is done in many studies). 
26the informational content of opening and closing prices with care in relation to the 
various uses to which these prices are put. 
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30 Table 1.  Volatility Ratios for the Opening and the Closing Minutes 
The table provides summary statistics for the volatility ratio for the opening and the closing minutes using 
data from February 2004 and February 2005.  We define realized volatility measures for the first 1 minute 
through the first 30 minutes and for the last 1 minute through the last 30 minutes, 
as , where Range is the difference between the highest and the lowest prices, 
relative to the average price during a 1-minute interval and n corresponds to minutes 1, …, 30.  The 
volatility ratio is then defined as
¦    
n
i i n Range RV
1
2
N n N n RV RV Ratio   , .  For the opening minutes,   refers to 
the volatility ratio of the first n minutes to the first N minutes of the opening.  For the closing minutes, 
 refers to the volatility ratio of the last n minutes to the last N minutes of the closing.  The 
columns labeled p25 and p75 represent the volatility ratios for the lowest and third quartiles.  
N n Ratio ,
N n Ratio ,
Volatility Ratio 
Mean Median S.D. p25 p75 n
Ratio1,5 0.423 0.397 0.249 0.223 0.600 3947
Ratio2,5 0.628 0.656 0.239 0.460 0.822 3947
Ratio3,5 0.759 0.813 0.204 0.643 0.919 3947
Ratio4,5 0.884 0.935 0.139 0.842 0.978 3947
Ratio1,30 0.177 0.128 0.160 0.060 0.248 3952
Ratio2,30 0.262 0.219 0.187 0.114 0.369 3952
Ratio3,30 0.312 0.276 0.195 0.158 0.437 3952
Ratio4,30 0.358 0.332 0.199 0.204 0.490 3952
Opening 
Ratio5,30 0.399 0.374 0.201 0.244 0.540 3952
Ratio1,5 0.513 0.524 0.244 0.319 0.708 3952
Ratio2,5 0.664 0.701 0.215 0.526 0.835 3951
Ratio3,5 0.780 0.826 0.177 0.691 0.916 3952
Ratio4,5 0.888 0.929 0.124 0.852 0.974 3952
Ratio1,30 0.204 0.161 0.164 0.077 0.291 3952
Ratio2,30 0.255 0.221 0.172 0.120 0.356 3951
Ratio3,30 0.295 0.266 0.177 0.155 0.408 3952
Ratio4,30 0.330 0.304 0.180 0.190 0.449 3952
Closing 
Ratio5,30    0.366 0.346 0.182 0.225 0.489 3952
31T
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2Table 3.  The average Range and R_Range for ten-second intervals 
The table presents the univariate comparisons of mean and median volatility measures, Range and R_range, during the ten-
second interval for the selected Nasdaq stocks during February 2004 (before) and February 2005 (after), respectively.  Range,
measured in basis points, is the difference between the highest and the lowest prices, relative to the average price during the 
interval.  R_Range is the ratio of Range for the opening (or closing) ten-second intervals to the one-minute mid-day range, 
which is the average Range over one-minute intervals between 10:30-15:00 for the same stock on the same day.  Significance 
levels are computed for the percentage difference (before-after) in mean (medians) using a t-test and Wilcoxon two-sided t-
test. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  Panel A and B summarizes the results for the 
opening and the closing periods, respectively.  
33Table 3. Panel A. Opening period
Mean Median 
Range (bps)  R_Range Range (bps)  R_Range
Interval before after
%
diff. before after
%
diff. Before after
%
diff. before after
%
diff.
9:30:00-9:30:10 35.3 34.5 -2.5 4.5 4.9 9.3 36.1 31.5 -12.8 4.5 4.9 8.0
9:30:10-9:30:20 32.8 22.3 -31.9
*** 4.0 2.9 -29.1
*** 33.5 20.9 -37.6
*** 4.3 2.8 -35.1
***
9:30:20-9:30:30 30.2 20.2 -33.0
*** 3.6 2.6 -27.8
*** 30.8 17.9 -41.9
*** 3.6 2.5 -30.9
***
9:30:30-9:30:40 30.9 19.2 -37.7
*** 3.7 2.4 -34.5
*** 29.7 17.8 -40.0
*** 3.6 2.3 -36.5
***
9:30:40-9:30:50 25.4 15.7 -38.1
*** 2.9 1.9 -34.7
*** 24.0 13.9 -41.9
*** 2.9 1.8 -37.9
***
9:30:50-9:31:00 22.8 14.4 -36.6
*** 2.5 1.8 -26.8
*** 21.3 13.2 -38.0
*** 2.3 1.7 -25.9
***
9:31:00-9:31:10 20.2 12.1 -40.2
*** 2.2 1.5 -31.5
*** 17.8 10.2 -42.6
*** 2.2 1.4 -36.3
***
9:31:10-9:31:20 19.4 10.0 -48.4
*** 2.1 1.1 -46.1
*** 17.3 8.5 -50.6
*** 2.1 1.1 -45.5
***
9:31:20-9:31:30 17.9 9.6 -46.5
*** 1.8 1.1 -39.8
*** 15.4 7.8 -49.1
*** 1.9 1.0 -44.2
***
9:31:30-9:31:40 13.1 7.6 -41.7
*** 1.3 0.9 -33.3
*** 9.4 5.6 -40.9
*** 1.2 0.8 -36.7
***
9:31:40-9:31:50 11.6 9.2 -20.9
** 1.2 1.1 -8.4 8.6 7.8 -8.9
* 1.1 1.1 -5.3
9:31:50-9:32:00 11.0 9.7 -11.8 1.1 1.1 -1.9 9.6 7.5 -21.3
** 1.0 1.1 1.2
9:32:00-9:32:10 11.0 8.2 -25.5
*** 1.1 0.9 -17.1
** 9.4 6.3 -33.0
*** 1.1 0.8 -30.1
**
9:32:10-9:32:20 10.8 8.4 -22.0
** 1.1 0.9 -17.7
*** 10.0 6.0 -39.5
** 1.1 0.9 -21.8
***
9:32:20-9:32:30 10.7 7.8 -27.3
*** 1.1 0.9 -20.3
*** 8.6 6.0 -29.7
*** 1.0 0.8 -26.1
***
9:32:30-9:32:40 9.9 7.5 -23.9
** 1.0 0.8 -18.4
** 8.5 5.0 -41.0
** 0.9 0.7 -22.8
**
9:32:40-9:32:50 9.1 7.8 -14.5 0.9 0.8 -8.8 7.2 6.3 -12.1 0.8 0.8 1.5
9:32:50-9:33:00 8.8 7.7 -13.4 0.9 0.8 -8.8 7.7 5.8 -25.1 0.9 0.7 -21.3
**
9:33:00-9:33:10 8.7 7.6 -12.4 0.9 0.9 -3.4 7.2 6.1 -15.1 0.8 0.8 -6.7
9:33:10-9:33:20 8.8 7.5 -15.1
* 0.9 0.9 -4.7 7.9 6.4 -19.3
* 0.9 0.8 -5.5
9:33:20-9:33:30 8.9 7.4 -17.5
** 0.9 0.8 -11.8
* 7.9 5.5 -29.4
*** 0.9 0.7 -22.8
***
9:33:30-9:33:40 8.6 6.6 -23.3
*** 0.9 0.7 -17.5
** 7.3 5.6 -23.3 0.9 0.7 -22.7
***
9:33:40-9:33:50 7.9 7.4 -5.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 6.5 6.0 -8.2 0.8 0.8 -2.3
9:33:50-9:34:00 8.8 7.3 -17.8
* 0.9 0.8 -10.2 6.7 5.3 -21.4 0.8 0.7 -14.7
*
9:34:00-9:34:10 7.9 6.9 -13.1 0.8 0.8 -7.3 6.2 5.7 -7.7 0.8 0.7 -8.7
9:34:10-9:34:20 8.4 6.6 -21.0
** 0.9 0.7 -21.3
*** 6.5 5.4 -17.2
* 0.8 0.6 -21.8
*
9:34:20-9:34:30 7.8 6.5 -17.4
* 0.8 0.7 -14.7
** 6.2 4.5 -27.4
* 0.8 0.7 -17.8
**
9:34:30-9:34:40 7.6 6.1 -19.4
** 0.8 0.7 -16.0
** 7.4 4.3 -41.0
** 0.8 0.6 -25.5
***
9:34:40-9:34:50 7.7 6.8 -12.0 0.8 0.8 -5.8 6.1 5.3 -13.0 0.8 0.8 -1.0
9:34:50-9:35:00 9.1 7.7 -14.9
* 1.0 0.9 -8.9
* 8.2 6.3 -22.7
* 1.0 0.9 -13.4
**
34Table 3. Panel B. Closing period
Mean Median 
Range (bps)  R_Range Range (bps)  R_Range
Interval before after
%
diff. before after 
%
diff. Before after
%
diff. before after 
%
diff.
15:55:10-15:55:10 5.3 4.6 -13.6 0.6 0.5 -12.9
*** 4.8 3.0 -37.8
*** 0.6 0.5 -17.4
***
15:55:10-15:55:20 4.9 4.0 -17.6 0.6 0.4 -19.8
*** 4.0 2.7 -32.2
*** 0.5 0.4 -27.1
***
15:55:20-15:55:30 4.6 4.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 -1.3 3.7 3.1 -17.6
* 0.5 0.5 -7.6
15:55:30-15:55:40 4.6 4.4 -4.3 0.5 0.5 -2.7 3.9 3.3 -15.5
** 0.5 0.4 -8.2
*
15:55:40-15:55:50 4.4 4.2 -3.9 0.5 0.4 -12.4
** 3.4 2.7 -20.1
* 0.5 0.4 -17.4
*
15:55:50-15:56:00 5.0 4.9 -2.1 0.6 0.6 -2.7 4.1 3.4 -17.8
* 0.6 0.5 -13.4
*
15:56:00-15:56:10 5.2 4.4 -16.5 0.6 0.5 -15.3
*** 4.3 3.1 -27.6
*** 0.6 0.5 -14.7
*
15:56:10-15:56:20 4.7 4.0 -16.0 0.5 0.4 -15.4
*** 3.8 2.9 -22.4
*** 0.5 0.4 -15.4
***
15:56:20-15:56:30 5.6 4.4 -20.9
** 0.6 0.5 -20.6
*** 5.1 3.0 -40.0
*** 0.6 0.4 -33.0
***
15:56:30-15:56:40 5.3 4.2 -20.2
* 0.6 0.5 -19.9
*** 4.2 3.0 -28.6
*** 0.6 0.4 -29.9
***
15:56:40-15:56:50 4.8 3.9 -18.6
* 0.6 0.4 -22.5
*** 3.9 2.7 -31.9
*** 0.5 0.4 -24.0
***
15:56:50-15:57:00 5.0 4.7 -5.7 0.6 0.6 -4.1 4.2 3.4 -20.2
* 0.5 0.5 -5.5
15:57:00-15:57:10 5.4 4.4 -18.3
* 0.6 0.5 -15.9
*** 4.2 3.3 -21.9
*** 0.6 0.5 -19.0
***
15:57:10-15:57:20 5.0 4.5 -10.5 0.6 0.5 -13.7
*** 4.3 3.3 -22.4
*** 0.6 0.5 -17.2
***
15:57:20-15:57:30 5.8 4.8 -16.7 0.6 0.5 -13.7
*** 4.9 3.3 -33.5
*** 0.6 0.5 -20.1
***
15:57:30-15:57:40 5.5 4.2 -23.9
** 0.6 0.5 -26.7
*** 4.6 2.7 -40.6
*** 0.6 0.4 -28.8
***
15:57:40-15:57:50 5.2 4.4 -15.8 0.6 0.5 -19.1
*** 4.4 3.2 -26.1
*** 0.5 0.4 -16.2
***
15:57:50-15:58:00 6.5 5.4 -16.0 0.7 0.6 -16.9
*** 5.7 3.7 -35.5
*** 0.7 0.5 -19.2
***
15:58:00-15:58:10 5.9 5.8 -1.7 0.7 0.7 3.1 4.9 3.9 -19.0
** 0.6 0.6 1.3
15:58:10-15:58:20 5.3 5.4 1.2 0.6 0.6 2.8 4.2 3.6 -14.5 0.5 0.6 3.1
15:58:20-15:58:30 6.0 6.2 2.7 0.7 0.8 11.8
* 4.7 4.5 -3.8 0.6 0.7 4.4
15:58:30-15:58:40 6.5 5.7 -12.6
** 0.8 0.7 -8.2
*** 5.5 4.8 -13.4
*** 0.7 0.6 -10.6
***
15:58:40-15:58:50 6.7 5.0 -25.0 0.8 0.6 -26.7 5.5 3.6 -33.6
*** 0.7 0.5 -28.6
***
15:58:50-15:59:00 6.9 6.4 -7.9 0.8 0.8 -6.9 5.8 4.6 -20.3
** 0.8 0.7 -7.3
15:59:00-15:59:10 6.7 5.9 -11.7 0.8 0.7 -8.6
* 6.0 4.5 -25.3
** 0.7 0.7 -5.9
**
15:59:10-15:59:20 7.6 7.1 -6.7 0.9 0.8 -13.9
** 6.8 4.9 -28.7
** 0.8 0.8 -10.6
**
15:59:20-15:59:30 10.0 8.1 -19.2
*** 1.3 1.1 -16.3
*** 8.7 7.0 -19.3
** 1.1 1.0 -12.4
***
15:59:30-15:59:40 12.5 8.4 -32.4
*** 1.6 1.1 -32.4
*** 10.5 6.9 -34.1
*** 1.5 1.0 -28.9
***
15:59:40-15:59:50 20.5 10.7 -47.6
*** 2.9 1.4 -52.1
*** 19.2 9.0 -53.1
*** 2.4 1.3 -46.4
***
15:59:50-16:00:00 33.7 19.1 -43.3
*** 7.8 2.8 -64.5
* 28.1 15.8 -43.7
*** 3.8 2.5 -35.1
***
35Table 4. Summary statistics for regression variables 
The table provides summary statistics for regression variables during the opening and the closing five minutes of the trading day for 
the selected Nasdaq stocks during the two months February 2004 and February 2005.  retstd is the standard deviation of a stock’s 
percentage weekly returns, measured over the period of 2/2003 to 1/2004. lmcap is the logarithmic of the market capitalization 
measured at the end of January 2004.  The rest of the variables are measured during ten-second intervals of the open and the close.  
Range, measured in basis points, is the difference between the highest and the lowest prices for the, relative to the average price 
during the interval.  The variable Spread, measured in basis points, is the average of the actual quoted spread relative to the average 
price during the interval.  The variable Numtrades captures the total number of trades during the interval.  The variable Avgtdsize is 
defined as the share trading volume (Volume) divided by the number of trades during the interval.  R_Range is the ratio of Range for 
the opening (or closing) ten-second intervals to the mid-day range, which is the average Range over one-minute intervals between 
10:30-15:00 for the same stock on the same day.  Similar to the construction of R_Range, we compute R_Spread, R_Numtrades, and
R_Avgtdsize for the opening and closing intervals as the ratio of Spread, Numtrades, and Avgtdsize to their corresponding mid-day 
level, respectively. 
Mean Median S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
Lower
Quartile
Upper 
Quartile n
retstd 5.41 5.15 1.93 0.57 -0.32 4.04 6.70 471960
lmcap 9.01 8.71 0.98 1.31 1.76 8.28 9.48 471960
range 30.92 0.00 907.59 79.21 8264.62 0.00 6.86 474240
spread 20.05 9.18 43.60 6.51 50.01 4.77 18.50 378522
volume 9455 1300 40802 24 1158 300 5500 474240
numtrades 9.42 3.00 22.76 9.12 227.36 1.00 8.00 474240
avgtdsize 1474 350 7388 29 1443 193 895 424690
r_range 2.71 0.00 106.96 105.44 13921.73 0.00 0.76 474240
r_spread 1.79 1.01 3.25 8.67 140.20 0.56 1.89 378522
r_volume 1.39 0.30 4.46 21.76 1656.54 0.09 0.88 474240
r_numtrades 0.65 0.37 1.39 59.89 9767.52 0.18 0.72 474240
r_avgtdsize 2.09 0.84 6.73 19.40 782.81 0.49 1.53 424690
36Table 5. Multivariate regression analysis of volatility during the opening minutes 
The table reports the regression analysis for ten-second interval volatility estimates during the opening five minutes of the 
trading day for the selected Nasdaq stocks during the two months February 2004 and February 2005.  Panel A uses Range 
as the volatility measure and Panel B uses R_range as the volatility measure.  retstd is the standard deviation of a stock’s  
percentage weekly returns, measured over the period of 2/2003 to 1/2004. lmcap is the logarithmic of the market 
capitalization measured at the end of January 2004.  The rest of the variables are measured during ten-second intervals of 
the open and the close.  Range is the difference between the highest and the lowest prices for the, relative to the average 
price during the interval.  R_Range is the ratio of Range for the opening (or closing) ten-second intervals to the mid-day 
range, which is the average Range over one-minute intervals between 10:30-15:00 for the same stock on the same day.  
mini, where i=1,2,3, is a dummy variable that equal to 1 if the interval is within the ith minute of the open and 0 otherwise.  
after is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for 2005 and 0 for 2004.  min_ai is equal to the product of mini with after.  The 
variable Spread, measured in basis points, is the average of the actual quoted spread relative to the average price during the 
interval.  The variable Numtrades captures the total number of trades during the interval.  The variable Avgtdsize is defined 
as the share trading volume divided by the number of trades during the interval.  Similar to the construction of R_Range,
we compute R_Spread, R_Numtrades, and R_Avgtdsize for the opening and closing intervals as the ratio of Spread, 
Numtrades, and Avgtdsize to their corresponding mid-day level, respectively.  The Huber/White/sandwich robust standard 
errors with firm level clustering are shown in parentheses.   The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are indicated by *, 
**, and *** respectively. 
Panel A: Volatility measure: Range
12
min1 13.339*** 16.528*** 
(0.596) (0.753) 
min2 3.501*** 5.611***
(0.297) (0.454) 
min3 0.625*** 0.914***
(0.177) (0.214) 
after -3.747*** -1.489*** 
(0.350) (0.311) 
min_a1 -6.380*** 
(0.700) 
min_a2 -4.237*** 
(0.436) 
min_a3 -0.594** 
(0.252) 
Lmcap 0.064 0.095
(0.500) (0.498) 
Retstd 1.713*** 1.717***
(0.313) (0.314) 
spread 0.272*** 0.274***
(0.058) (0.058) 
numtrades 0.213*** 0.211***
(0.043) (0.043) 
avgtdsize (10
-2) 0.042** 0.042**
(0.021) (0.020) 
constant -6.976 -8.411
(5.532) (5.518) 
Adj. R
2 0.261 0.265
N 117926 117926 
37Table 5. Panel B: Volatility measure: R_Range
12
min1 1.490*** 1.750***
(0.067) (0.094) 
min2 0.307*** 0.515***
(0.032) (0.040) 
min3 0.031 0.061**
(0.022) (0.025) 
after -0.220*** -0.018
(0.034) (0.027) 
min_a1 -0.525*** 
(0.098) 
min_a2 -0.422*** 
(0.040) 
min_a3 -0.065** 
(0.028) 
lmcap 0.258*** 0.259***
(0.036) (0.036) 
retstd 0.115*** 0.116***
(0.029) (0.029) 
R_spread 0.322*** 0.325***
(0.025) (0.024) 
R_numtrades 1.641*** 1.632***
(0.149) (0.149) 
R_avgtdsize 0.010** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) 
constant -3.364***  -3.479*** 
(0.439) (0.443) 
Adj. R
2 0.297 0.299
N 117926 117926 
38Table 6.  Multivariate regression analysis of volatility during the closing minutes 
The table reports the regression analysis for ten-second interval volatility estimates during the closing five minutes 
of the trading day for the selected Nasdaq stocks during the two months February 2004 and February 2005.  Panel A 
uses Range as the volatility measure and Panel B uses R_range as the volatility measure.  retstd is the standard 
deviation of a stock’s percentage weekly returns, measured over the period of 2/2003 to 1/2004. lmcap is the 
logarithmic of the market capitalization measured at the end of January 2004.  The rest of the variables are measured 
during ten-second intervals of the open and the close.  Range is the difference between the highest and the lowest 
prices for the, relative to the average price during the interval.  R_Range is the ratio of Range for the opening (or 
closing) ten-second intervals to the mid-day range, which is the average Range over one-minute intervals between 
10:30-15:00 for the same stock on the same day.  mini, where i=1,2,3, is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
interval is within the i
th minute of the close and 0 otherwise.  after is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for 2005 and 
0 for 2004.  min_ai is equal to the product of mini with after. sec_i, where i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if the interval is within the ith ten-second interval of the close.  sec_ai is the product of seci with after.
The variable Spread, measured in basis points, is the average of the actual quoted spread relative to the average price 
during the interval.  The variable Numtrades captures the total number of trades during the interval.  The variable 
Avgtdsize is defined as the share trading volume divided by the number of trades during the interval.  Similar to the 
construction of R_Range, we compute R_Spread, R_Numtrades, and R_Avgtdsize for the opening and closing 
intervals as the ratio of Spread, Numtrades, and Avgtdsize to their corresponding mid-day level, respectively.  The 
Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors with firm level clustering are shown in parentheses.  The 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
39Panel A: Volatility measure: Range
123
min1 0.832*** 2.677*** 1.428***
(0.146) (0.232) (0.171) 
min2 0.715*** 0.941*** 0.944***
(0.083) (0.104) (0.104) 
min3 0.191*** 0.415*** 0.417***
(0.055) (0.079) (0.079) 
sec_1 2.199*** 2.203*** 2.807***
(0.119) (0.120) (0.151) 
sec_2 1.250*** 1.251*** 1.875***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.105) 
sec_3 0.633*** 0.631*** 0.857***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.074) 
sec_4 0.511*** 0.508*** 0.599***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.068) 
sec_5 0.367*** 0.370*** 0.183*
(0.086) (0.086) (0.097) 
after -1.383*** -0.428** -0.424** 
(0.202) (0.179) (0.178) 
min_a1 -3.690*** -1.178*** 
(0.282) (0.200) 
min_a2 -0.454*** -0.448*** 
(0.126) (0.126) 
min_a3 -0.449*** -0.446*** 
(0.128) (0.128) 
sec_a1 -1.192*** 
(0.138) 
sec_a2 -1.240*** 
(0.117) 
sec_a3 -0.438*** 
(0.092) 
sec_a4 -0.163* 
(0.086) 
sec_a5 0.372**
(0.153) 
lmcap -0.218 -0.216 -0.202
(0.210) (0.210) (0.209) 
retstd 0.520*** 0.524*** 0.530***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
spread 0.552*** 0.549*** 0.545***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.060) 
numtrades 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.111***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
avgtdsize(10
-2) 0.008 0.010 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant -1.325 -1.811 -1.926
(2.236) (2.222) (2.215) 
Adj. R
2 0.442 0.447 0.451
N 109444 109444 109444 
40Table 6. Panel B: Volatility measure: R_Range
123
min1 0.045*** 0.214*** 0.115***
(0.015) (0.031)  (0.022) 
min2 0.031*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) 
min3 0.008 0.022** 0.022**
(0.006) (0.009)  (0.009) 
sec_1 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.213***
(0.009) (0.010)  (0.017) 
sec_2 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.170***
(0.009) (0.009)  (0.017) 
sec_3 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.086***
(0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) 
sec_4 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.008)  (0.011) 
sec_5 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.042**
(0.009) (0.010)  (0.017) 
after -0.124*** -0.034***  -0.035*** 
(0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
min_a1 -0.337*** -0.137*** 
(0.060) (0.033) 
min_a2 -0.067*** -0.067*** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
min_a3 -0.027** -0.027** 
(0.012) (0.012) 
sec_a1 -0.059*** 
(0.020) 
sec_a2 -0.117*** 
(0.018) 
sec_a3 -0.042*** 
(0.012) 
sec_a4 -0.025
(0.016) 
sec_a5 -0.007
(0.023) 
lmcap 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) 
retstd 0.015** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
R_spread 0.450*** 0.449*** 0.445***
(0.023) (0.022)  (0.022) 
R_numtrades 0.943*** 0.936*** 0.929***
(0.061) (0.060)  (0.060) 
R_avgtdsize 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
constant -0.716***  -0.747***  -0.730*** 
(0.104) (0.106)  (0.104) 
Adj. R
2 0.453 0.455 0.456
N 109444 109444  109444 
41Table 7.  Correlation of overnight volatility and opening volatility 
This table presents the correlation of the overnight volatility with the volatility of the opening minutes 
on the following day.  |ro/n| is the overnight return volatility measured as the absolute value of the 
overnight returns.  Range1 is the Range measure over the 1
st minute of the open.  Avgrange2-5 is the 
average value of Range measured over the first 2-5 minutes, respectively.  The P-values are shown in 
parentheses. N is the number of observations. 
Panel A: Full sample correlation 
Range1 Avgrange2 Avgrange3 Avgrange4 Avgrange5 
2004/02
|ro/n| 0.18743 0.2223 0.2506 0.25416 0.26208 
P-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  1560 1560 1560 1560 1560
2005/02
|ro/n| 0.13284 0.16488 0.18552 0.19203 0.19317 
P-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  1456 1456 1456 1456 1456
Test of the difference 
P-value 0.124 0.102 0.061 0.073 0.046
Panel B: Correlation of the 20 largest firms 
Range1 Avgrange2 Avgrange3 Avgrange4 Avgrange5 
2004/02
|ro/n| 0.51643 0.5129 0.55329 0.55417 0.55688 
P-value (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 N  300 300 300 300 300
2005/02
|ro/n| -0.02841 -0.0056 0.0142 0.02191 0.02807 
P-value (0.636)  (0.926) (0.813)  (0.715)  (0.640) 
 N  280 280 280 280 280
Test of the difference 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
42Table 7. Panel C: Correlation of the 64 middle size firms 
Range1 Avgrange2 Avgrange3 Avgrange4 Avgrange5 
2004/02
|ro/n| 0.16107 0.1972 0.2264 0.23061 0.23732 
P-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  960 960 960 960 960
2005/02
|ro/n| 0.37093 0.44018 0.47919 0.4923 0.48833 
P-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  896 896 896 896 896
test of the difference 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7. Panel D: Correlation of the 20 smallest firms 
Range1 Avgrange2 Avgrange3 Avgrange4 Avgrange5 
2004/02
|ro/n| 0.15462 0.22509 0.25658 0.26604 0.29559 
P-value  (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  300 300 300 300 300
2005/02
|ro/n| 0.4049 0.44299 0.47231 0.47827 0.48032 
P-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 N  280 280 280 280 280
test of the difference 
P-value 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009
43Table 8.  Correlation of closing return and overnight return 
This table presents the correlation of the closing return and the subsequent overnight return.  For February 2004, we define 
r1 as the one-minute logarithmic return based on the price at 3:59 pm and the closing price at 4:00 pm.   For February 
2005, we decompose the return from 3:59 pm until closing (r1) into two returns: r1a (the one-minute return from 3:59-4:00 
pm) and r1b (the return from 4:00 pm to the official closing price—which is usually determined within the one-minute 
period, 4:00-4:01 pm).  For both months, we define r2 as the overnight logarithmic return based on the previous day’s 
closing price and the current day’s opening).  The P-values are shown in parentheses.   N is the number of observations.  
The 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
Feb 04 Feb 05
Panel A. Full sample correlations 
Feb-04
   r1   
R2 -0.055 **
P-value (0.03) 
 N  1560   
Feb-05
r1 r2 r1a
R2 -0.043
P-value (0.10) 
 N  1456
R1a 0.486 *** -0.004
P-value (0.00)  (0.88) 
 N  1976 1456
R1b 0.863 *** -0.048 * -0.023 
P-value (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.31) 
 N  1976 1456 1976
P value of correlation test
corr(r1,r2) before= corr(r1,r2)after  0.744
corr(r1,r2) before= corr(r1a, r2)after  0.162
15:59  16:00  Opening
r1 r2
15:59 16:00
r1a r2
Closing 
cross
r1b
Opening
44Table 8. Panel B: Correlation of the 20 largest firms 
Feb-04
r1
R2 -0.241 ***
P-value (0.00) 
 N  300
Feb-05
r1 r2 r1a
R2 -0.015
P-value (0.81) 
 N  280
R1a 0.485 *** 0.054
P-value (0.00)  (0.36) 
 N  380 280
R1b 0.886 *** -0.045 0.023
P-value (0.00)  (0.45)  (0.65) 
 N  380 280 380
P value of correlation test
corr(r1,r2) before= corr(r1,r2)after  0.006
corr(r1,r2) before=(r1a, r2)after  0.000
Panel C: Correlation of the 64 middle sized firms 
Feb-04
r1
r2 -0.033
P-value (0.30) 
 N  960
Feb-05
   r1 r2 r1a
r2 -0.138 ***
P-value (0.00) 
 N  896
r1a 0.464 *** -0.036
P-value (0.00)  (0.28) 
 N  1216 896
r1b 0.865 *** -0.139 *** -0.043
P-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14) 
 N  1216 896 1216
P value of correlation test
corr(r1,r2) before=  corr(r1,r2)after  0.023
corr(r1,r2) before= corr (r1a, r2)after  0.945
45Table 8. Panel D: Correlation of the 20 smallest firms 
Feb-04
r1
r2 -0.315 ***
P-value (0.00) 
 N  300
Feb-05
r1 r2 r1a
r2 -0.031
P-value (0.61) 
 N  280
r1a 0.539 *** -0.063
P-value (0.00)  (0.30) 
 N  380 280
r1b 0.840 *** 0.004 -0.005
P-value (0.00)  (0.95)  (0.92) 
 N  380 280 380
P value of correlation test
corr(r1,r2) before=  corr(r1,r2)after  0.000
corr(r1,r2) before= corr (r1a, r2)after  0.002
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8Table 10.  Trading Activity: Volume and Numtrades for ten-second intervals 
The table presents the univariate comparisons of mean and median volume-related measures, Volume and Numtrades,
during the ten-second interval for the full sample of Nasdaq stocks during February 2004 (before) and February 2005 
(after), respectively.  Volume is the number of shares traded during each time interval.  Numtrades is the number of 
trades executed during each time interval.  Significance levels are computed for the percentage difference (before-after) 
in mean (medians) using a t-test and Wilcoxon two-sided t-test. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
*** respectively.  Panel A and B summarizes the results for the opening and the closing periods, respectively.  
Panel A. Opening period
Mean Median 
Volume (shares)  Numtrades Volume (shares)  Numtrades
Interval  before after 
%
diff before after  after  % diff  before  after  % diff  before  % diff 
9:30:00-9:30:10  22165  17776  -19.8  42.5  38.6  -9.3     7440 6217 -16.4     22.8  19.5  -14.1    
9:30:10-9:30:20  16590  10957  -34.0  26.0  21.9  -15.9  5800 3048 -47.4 ** 13.0  9.9  -24.0 **
9:30:20-9:30:30  14238  10352  -27.3  20.6  18.9  -8.4  4735 2577 -45.6 * 12.0  8.5  -29.0 *
9:30:30-9:30:40 13413 9981 -25.6  19.6  19.8 0.8  4166 2527 -39.3  * 12.6  9.9  -21.6 
9:30:40-9:30:50 10176 8341 -18.0  16.0  16.4 2.7  3464 2152 -37.9  * 9.0  6.9  -23.4 
9:30:50-9:31:00 8797 8414 -4.4  15.3  17.1  11.9  2628 2333 -11.2  8.4  8.3  -1.0 
9:31:00-9:31:10 8078 7000 -13.3  14.3  15.0  4.6  2560 1674 -34.6  8.3  7.0  -15.2 
9:31:10-9:31:20 8255 6763 -18.1  14.0  15.5  10.4  2633 2010 -23.7  7.9  7.1  -10.0 
9:31:20-9:31:30 7748 6491 -16.2  13.3  14.8  11.7  2460 1926 -21.7  8.2  7.6  -8.2   
9:31:30-9:31:40 6404 6077 -5.1  11.4  13.6  19.0  1890 1617 -14.4  6.5  5.8  -9.4 
9:31:40-9:31:50 5902 6267 6.2  10.6  14.8  39.3  * 2135 1812 -15.1  7.0  6.8  -3.5   
9:31:50-9:32:00 6106 6862 12.4  11.4  15.6  37.0  * 2281 1722 -24.5  7.3  6.9  -5.6   
9:32:00-9:32:10 5845 6478 10.8  11.1  13.8  24.0  2153 1555 -27.8  7.0  5.5  -21.3 
9:32:10-9:32:20 6100 5818 -4.6  11.2  13.6  21.9  2328 1609 -30.9  6.6  5.8  -12.7 
9:32:20-9:32:30 6004 6209 3.4  11.0  14.2  28.8  2005 1411 -29.6  6.6  5.7  -13.4 
9:32:30-9:32:40 6021 5942 -1.3  10.2  13.4  31.0  2128 1795 -15.6  6.2  6.2  -0.8 
9:32:40-9:32:50 6113 6029 -1.4  10.8  13.8  27.0  2021 1682 -16.8  6.5  6.7  4.2 
9:32:50-9:33:00 5770 5941 3.0  10.3  14.3  38.1  * 2388 1813 -24.1  6.5  6.6  0.5 
9:33:00-9:33:10 5909 6469 9.5  11.2  15.3  36.4  * 2202 1942 -11.8  7.0  6.7  -4.5   
9:33:10-9:33:20 5909 6324 7.0  11.2  15.3  36.4  * 2461 1929 -21.6  7.1  6.8  -4.2   
9:33:20-9:33:30 5601 6047 8.0  11.4  15.2  34.1  * 1947 1933 -0.8  7.1  7.2  1.1 
9:33:30-9:33:40 5882 6096 3.6  11.7  13.8  17.7  2639 1487 -43.7  7.6  6.1  -19.4  *
9:33:40-9:33:50 5807 6647 14.5  11.0  15.2  38.1  * 1962 1816 -7.5  7.3  6.2  -15.1 
9:33:50-9:34:00 5764 6564 13.9  10.7  16.0  48.6  ** 2224 1772 -20.3  6.1  7.0  14.1 
9:34:00-9:34:10 6007 6473 7.8  11.0  14.6  32.9  2304 1725 -25.1  7.3  6.9  -6.1   
9:34:10-9:34:20 5923 6580 11.1  11.0  14.2  28.6  2510 1807 -28.0  * 7.5  6.0  -19.6 
9:34:20-9:34:30 6003 6003 0.0  11.2  14.2  26.8  2376 1880 -20.9  * 6.8  5.9  -13.0 
9:34:30-9:34:40 6930 6025 -13.1  11.1  14.2  28.0  2429 1834 -24.5  6.1  6.3  2.8 
9:34:40-9:34:50 5823 5854 0.5  11.2  15.1  35.5  * 2361 2298 -2.7  7.1  6.9  -3.4   
9:34:50-9:35:00 5924 6542 10.4  12.3  15.9  30.0  * 2692 2216 -17.7  8.2  8.6  5.9 
49Table 10. Panel B. Closing period
Mean Median
Volume (shares)  Numtrades Volume (shares)  Numtrades
Interval Before  after  %  diff  Before  after  %  diff  before  after 
%
diff
befo
re after %  diff 
15:55:10-15:55:10 5552 5938 7.0    10.5  13.5  28.9  * 2369 2297 -3.0     6.9  8.2  18.4    
15:55:10-15:55:20 4913 5767 17.4 9.4 12.5  32.7 * 2138 2061 -3.6  6.5  7.0  7.8 
15:55:20-15:55:30 5034 6152 22.2 9.3 14.5  57.0 ***  2052 2349 14.5  6.1  7.4  21.6 *
15:55:30-15:55:40 4819 6351 31.8 9.1 12.7  40.6 ** 2265 2406 6.2  6.0  6.9  14.0 
15:55:40-15:55:50 4599 6476 40.8 8.5 13.0  52.7 ** 2178 2422 11.2  5.7  7.2  25.9 **
15:55:50-15:56:00 5633 7389 31.2 10.9 15.6  43.1 ** 2494 2543 2.0  7.7  7.9  3.7 
15:56:00-15:56:10 5842 6755 15.6 10.7 14.7  38.3 ** 2469 2126 -13.9  7.0  8.2  16.3 
15:56:10-15:56:20 5453 5613 2.9 9.9 12.1  22.5  2200 2046 -7.0  6.6  7.1  8.0 
15:56:20-15:56:30 6714 6696 -0.3 12.4 14.1  13.7  3042 2852 -6.3  8.8  7.8  -12.0 
15:56:30-15:56:40 6235 6200 -0.6 11.4 13.1  15.2  2810 2222 -20.9  6.9  7.3  5.2 
15:56:40-15:56:50 5253 5851 11.4 9.5 12.3  30.3  2044 1827 -10.6  5.4  6.0  12.6 
15:56:50-15:57:00 5727 6711 17.2 10.5 15.1  43.6 ** 2772 2864 3.3  7.7  8.6  11.8 *
15:57:00-15:57:10 7281 7258 -0.3 12.0 15.1  26.1  3303 2393 -27.5  7.4  7.6  1.7 
15:57:10-15:57:20 5823 6503 11.7 10.2 13.6  34.0 * 2678 1998 -25.4  6.6  7.1  7.7 
15:57:20-15:57:30 8212 6365 -22.5 13.3 13.7  3.2  3189 2448 -23.2  8.1  8.2  1.9 
15:57:30-15:57:40 7047 6208 -11.9 11.7 12.5  6.9  3265 2034 -37.7 * 7.8  5.8  -26.0 
15:57:40-15:57:50 6310 6202 -1.7 10.4 13.0  25.1  2944 2363 -19.7  7.0  6.8  -3.1 
15:57:50-15:58:00 9424 9043 -4.0 15.4 18.6  20.9  3852 3443 -10.6  10.5 10.3  -2.0 
15:58:00-15:58:10 7459 10622  42.4 12.3 19.8  60.9 ***  3284 3766 14.7  7.9  10.3  30.1 ***
15:58:10-15:58:20 7440 9631 29.5 11.1 17.4  56.4 ***  3594 3330 -7.4  6.6  8.6  30.0 
15:58:20-15:58:30 8981 9827 9.4 13.5 19.8  46.3 ** 3823 4054 6.0  9.2 11.7  26.7 
15:58:30-15:58:40 8403 8603 2.4 13.6 17.0  25.1  3223 3784 17.4  9.2  9.7  5.3 
15:58:40-15:58:50 8365 8940 6.9 13.2 14.3  8.4  3179 2866 -9.8  8.1  7.1  -12.6 
15:58:50-15:59:00 10109  10119  0.1 14.6 19.1  31.0 * 3766 3550 -5.7  9.0 10.0  11.2 
15:59:00-15:59:10 8878 10533  18.6 13.7 19.9  45.1 ** 4031 4231 5.0  8.5  9.7  13.6 
15:59:10-15:59:20 9842 10868  10.4 15.1 20.7  37.4 ** 3535 4034 14.1  8.8 10.7  22.2 
15:59:20-15:59:30 11987  12980  8.3 20.0 26.3  31.1 * 5653 5605 -0.9  13.1 16.9  28.7 
15:59:30-15:59:40 13312  11926  -10.4 22.0 23.9  8.8  6133 5132 -16.3  15.0 13.8  -8.2 
15:59:40-15:59:50 20348  15136  -25.6 34.6 30.3  -12.4  9623 5018 -47.9 * 24.4 16.6  -32.0 **
15:59:50-16:00:00 26271  67197  155.8 ***  46.2  37.6  -18.6  *    12464  22939  84.0  ***     35.3  24.9  -29.5  ***
50 Figure 1.  1-minute interval volatility
The figure presents the median Range across the Nasdaq stocks for one minute intervals during February 
2004 (Panel A) and February 2005 (Panel B), respectively.  Range, measured in basis points, is the 
difference between the highest and the lowest prices, relative to the average price during the interval.  We 
calculate the mean volatility measures of Range over the nineteen trading days for each of the two months 
for every individual stock and each time interval.  We then calculate, for the stocks in each of the two 
months, the cross-sectional median of the stocks’ mean volatility values for each interval.  Intervals 1 to 
390 correspond to the 390 minutes between 9:30-16:00. 
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51Figure 2.  10-second interval volatility for the opening and the closing minutes 
The figure presents the median Range across the Nasdaq stocks for ten-second intervals during February 
2004 (Panel A) and February 2005 (Panel B), respectively.  Range, measured in basis points, is the 
difference between the highest and the lowest prices, relative to the average price during the interval.  We 
calculate the mean volatility measures of Range over the nineteen trading days for each of the two months 
for every individual stock and each time interval.  We then calculate, for the stocks in each of the two 
months, the cross-sectional median of the stocks’ mean volatility values for each interval.  Intervals 1 to 30 
correspond to the thirty 10-second intervals between 9:30-9:35.  Intervals 31 to 60 correspond to the thirty 
10-second intervals between 15:55-16:00. 
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Figure 2.  Panel B. Median Range for February 2005 
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52Figure 3.  1-minute interval volume  
The figure presents the median Volume (in 100 shares) across the Nasdaq stocks for one minute intervals 
during the opening periods and closing periods for February 2004 and February 2005.  Panel A and B 
shows the opening periods’ volume for 2004 and 2005.  Panel C and D shows the closing periods’ volume 
for 2004 and 2005.  Volume is the number of shares traded during each time interval.  We calculate the 
mean of Volume over the nineteen trading days for each of the two months for every individual stock and 
each time interval.  We then calculate, for the stocks in each of the two months, the cross-sectional median 
of the stocks’ mean volatility values for each interval.  Intervals -4 to 25 correspond to the 30 minutes 
between 9:26-9:56.  Interval 0 corresponds to the minute between 9:30-9:31, during which the opening 
cross occurred.  Intervals 365 to 395 correspond to the 30 minutes between 15:35-16:05.  Interval 390 
corresponds to the minute between 16:00-16:01, during which the closing cross occurred. 
53Panel A. Median Opening Volume for February 2004
Panel B. Median Opening Volume for February 2005
54Panel C. Median Closing Volume for February 2004 
Panel D. Median Closing Volume for February 2005
55Appendix 1.  Ticker Symbols for Stocks used in the Analysis 
Nasdaq Firms 
MSFT APOL TROW WFMI
INTC LLTC SAFC SIAL
CSCO GENZ BPOP ROST
DELL SYMC MCHP EXPD
AMGN BBBY NTLI PMCS
ORCL KLAC CDWC IVGN
CMCSA JNPR SNPS TLAB
QCOM NTRS MEDI NVDA
EBAY BRCM ESRX FAST
AMAT BMET ZION DLTR
FITB CHIR MLNM LRCX 
YHOO INTU NVLS XMSR
NXTL PCAR BEAS UTSI
AMZN DISH HBAN AMKR
IACI ADBE NOVL MRBK
SUNW ALTR APCC PIXR
MXIM AAPL CBSS CTSH
COST NTAP CECO ISIL
VRTS CTAS SNDK CMVT
BIIB HCBK VRSN ATML
XLNX JDSU PDCO CIEN
SBUX FISV SSCC XRAY
PAYX CINF MERQ CTXS
ERTS AMTD LVLT RHAT
GILD SEBL QLGC CELG
SPLS SANM FDRY GNTX
Matched Sample of NYSE Stocks 
C BEN RSH OCR 
MWD T NI LIZ
MO EDS SSP SEE
MRK XRX ET HNT
ABT CB EOG DYN
TWX DG LM FL
DIS LU ODP IRF
WYE AGN ROK STU
LOW SLR SII CPS
TXN LTR MWV VSH
ALL HRB Q KMX
F UVN SFA CAL
EMC MON LSI MIK
CA LNC TMK AV
COF JBL FFH SCG
GLW AES CVC PLL
BBY IPG WEC BE
STT THC FCS CNP
A AOC MXO PVN
SCH NFB TER OSI
RTN NSM DST ELX
WY PBG UIS TCB
FON ASD CVH DCN 
MEL WMB JNS WDC
ADI VLO WSM AVT
TJX AMD KG EAT
56Appendix 2. 
Nasdaq’s Closing Cross Procedure
37
  Nasdaq’s Opening and Closing Crosses are, with only minor differences, 
identically structured.  In this Appendix we describe the Closing Cross.  For further 
discussion, see Smith (2006). 
Closing Cross includes new order handling, display and price determination 
procedures; safeguards against unduly large price changes; and three new order types:
market-on-close (MOC) orders, limit-on-close (LOC) orders, and imbalance orders (IO).  
MOC and LOC orders are market and limit orders that can be executed only in Closing 
Cross.  Imbalance orders (which the facility starts accepting at 3:30 pm) are Closing 
Cross only limit orders that are designed to reduce any buy-sell imbalance that may exist 
at prices set at the 4:00 pm close of the continuous market.  Specifically, an IO sell will 
execute only if it is priced at or above the 4:00 pm Nasdaq offer, and an IO buy will 
execute only if it is priced at or below the 4:00 pm Nasdaq bid (consequently, IO orders 
will never trade against each other).  Consequently, IO sell orders execute only against 
buy imbalances that drive price up, IO buy orders execute only against sell imbalances 
that drive price down, and buy-sell IO orders never execute against each other.  IO orders 
can be entered until the time of the cross (but cannot be cancelled after 3:50 pm);  MOC 
and LOC orders cannot be entered after 3:50 pm. 
Between 3:50 pm and 4:00 pm, Nasdaq disseminates information about 
imbalances, indicative clearing prices, and the number of on-close and IO shares that 
could be matched at an indicative clearing price.  At 4:00 pm, no further orders are 
accepted, and the clearing prices are determined.  An algorithm is used to determine the 
clearing prices and the specific orders that trade.  Maximization of the number of shares 
that execute is the first criterion used for setting the call auction’s clearing price.  Time 
and price priorities imposed, with MOC orders receiving the highest priority.  All 
executed orders for a stock clear at a single price; executions includes buy orders at the 
stock’s clearing price and higher, and sell orders at the stock’s clearing price and lower.   
The Nasdaq computer sets the closing price stock-by-stock and reports all orders 
that execute for a stock as a single print. Generally, the reports are completed within 4 
seconds of the 4:00 pm cross, and Nasdaq Official Closing Prices (NOCPs) are 
disseminated at 4:01:30 pm. 
37 Appendix 2 draws from Pagano and Schwartz (2005). 
57Appendix 3. 
Robustness checks with matched sample of NYSE stocks 
 We have run additional robustness checks to assess the possibility that our 
findings of increased market quality at market openings and closings for Nasdaq stocks 
after the two Nasdaq calls were introduced have reflected, not the impact of the calls, but 
changes in market conditions and/or potential time trends in the market environment that 
occurred during our sample period.  To this end, we have compared our results for 
Nasdaq-listed firms with a matched sample of NYSE-listed firms.  The findings are 
discussed in this Appendix. 
The daily CRSP return file for 2003 (full year) was used for the matching.  Daily 
returns and trading volumes were used to generate weekly returns based on Wednesday-
to-Wednesday closing prices and weekly volume statistics.  The Nasdaq companies were 
then matched to the corresponding NYSE companies based on their market capitalization 
at the end of 2003 and their weekly return volatility, which is measured one year prior to 
February 2004.  We selected the NYSE firms that minimize the mean squared matching 
error (defined as the sum of the squared percentage differences in both the stocks’ 
logarithmic market capitalizations and the weekly return volatilities).  The matched 
NYSE firms are listed in Appendix 1.  
In Table A3.1, Panels A-C, we display test results using the median values of 
Range and R_Range for all observations within the matched NYSE sample.  For the 
opening 1-minute intervals, some significant increases and decreases in the range and 
relative range statistics are observed for the NYSE stocks during the period, February 
2004-February 2005, but there are no significant changes for the closing 1-minute 
interval volatility measures.  For the 10-second intervals within the first and the last 20-
30 seconds of trading, the volatilities for the NYSE stocks are actually higher in 2005 
than in 2004 (Table A3.1, Panel C shows that the range during the last 10 seconds of 
trading rose from 8.42 bps to 10.56 bps).  Overall, however, the 10-second interval 
volatility estimates during the first and the last five minutes of trading do not exhibit any 
pattern of significant differences between February 2004 and February 2005.  This 
58observation contrasts sharply with the significant pattern of changes observed for the 
Nasdaq stocks over the same time period.   
In Table A3.2, Panels A-C, we display test results using the median volume-
related measures (volume and number of trades) for all observations within the matched 
NYSE sample. NYSE trading volume declined for nearly the entire 9:25-9:40 period for 
February 2005 compared to February 2004.  Strikingly, a significant volume drop
occurred between 9:29 and 9:30 for the NYSE stocks (see Table A3.2, Panel A).
38  In 
contrast, Nasdaq’s trading volume declined significantly only during the pre-call period 
(9:25-9:29) and it jumped dramatically during the times of the opening and closing calls. 
We conclude that the Nasdaq and NYSE matched samples indeed exhibit 
significantly different behavior.  The differences in both intra-day volatility and trading 
volume patterns shown in Tables A3.1 and A3.2 for the NYSE sample give us confidence 
that the results for the Nasdaq stocks have not been driven by market-wide factors that 
affect both NYSE and Nasdaq stocks, but by the introduction of the electronic call 
auctions that apply to the Nasdaq marketplace. 
38 Volume decreased during the 9:25-9:29 period at both the NYSE and Nasdaq.  Thus, it appears that 
overall volume and trading activity was down during the pre-opening period in February 2005 relative to 
February 2004 on both exchanges, but the Nasdaq opening cross bucked this trend for the 9:29-9:30 time 
period.  Interestingly, NYSE volume decline continued throughout nearly the entire early morning period 
of 9:25-9:40, while Nasdaq's decline was concentrated in the pre-opening period.  These results are 
confirmed by both the mean and median results in Tables 9 and A3.2 (and thus are not being influenced by 
a few outliers). 
59Table A3.1  Volatility for matched NYSE firms 
The table presents the univariate comparisons of the median volatility measures, Range and R_range,
during the one-minute interval for the matched NYSE stocks during February 2004 (before) and February 
2005 (after), respectively.  Range, measured in basis points, is the difference between the highest and the 
lowest prices, relative to the average price during the interval.  R_Range is the ratio of Range for the 
opening (or closing) intervals to the mid-day range, which is the average Range over one-minute intervals 
between 10:30-15:00 for the same stock on the same day.  Significance levels are computed for the 
difference (before-after) in mean (medians) using a t-test and Wilcoxon two-sided t-test. The 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  Panel A presents the one-minute volatility measures 
for the opening and the closing minutes.  Panels B and C summarizes the ten-second volatility measures  
for the opening and the closing minutes, respectively. 
Panel A. 1-minute interval median volatility 
Range (bps)  R_Range 
Interval Before After before after   
9:31 4.59 110.92 *** 0.47 7.67 ***
9:32 13.23 11.39 1.427 1.307
9:33 18.45 13.64 * 2.086 1.492 *
9:34 14.5 16.2 1.9 1.618 *
9:35 20.16 13.97 *** 1.917 1.599
9:36 25.37 13.77 *** 1.84 1.505 **
9:37 15.55 16.93 1.659 1.739
9:38 22.36 14.82 *** 2.017 1.498 ***
9:39 15.71 14.73 ** 1.694 1.623 *
9:40 24.27 15.49 *** 2.09 1.498 ***
15:51 6.1 7.8 0.631 0.842 **
15:52 6.59 6.31 0.629 0.748
15:53 6.88 6.79 0.711 0.785
15:54 6.32 5.47 0.716 0.772
15:55 6.45 6.94 0.742 0.794
15:56 7.54 7.22 0.793 0.937
15:57 7.29 7.35 0.863 0.845
15:58 7.44 7.56 0.827 0.829
15:59 7.7 8.47 0.849 1.067
16:00 7.61 8.82 0.83 1.113
60Table A3.1 Panel B. 10-second interval median volatility for the opening minutes 
Range (bps)  R_Range 
Interval  before after before after
9:30:10   0 0.04 *** 0 0.002 ***
9:30:20   0 0.24 *** 0 0.016 ***
9:30:30   0.01 0.15 ** 0.001 0.006 **
9:30:40   0.04 0.33 0.002 0.021 *
9:30:50   0.06 0.45 * 0.005 0.033 **
9:31:00   0.09 0.86 * 0.008 0.045 **
9:31:10   0.07 0.61 * 0.007 0.028
9:31:20   0.14 0.68 ** 0.005 0.041 **
9:31:30   0.23 0.69 0.016 0.064
9:31:40   0.1 0.64 * 0.001 0.042
9:31:50   0.47 0.59 0.017 0.06
9:32:00   0.25 0.78 ** 0.002 0.057 **
9:32:10   0.53 1.02 0.036 0.097
9:32:20   0.59 0.98 0.042 0.057
9:32:30   0.38 0.77 0.015 0.049
9:32:40   0.41 1.26 * 0.05 0.086
9:32:50   0.46 0.96 0.028 0.117
9:33:00   0.3 1.08 0.018 0.098
9:33:10   0.63 1.52 * 0.032 0.106
9:33:20   0.38 0.81 * 0.029 0.074
9:33:30   1.1 0.97 0.091 0.11
9:33:40   0.8 1.00 0.049 0.102
9:33:50   0.57 0.88 0.044 0.069
9:34:00   0.73 1.09 0.031 0.092
9:34:10   0.92 1.19 0.055 0.084
9:34:20   0.94 1.02 0.068 0.083
9:34:30   0.85 1.14 0.09 0.087
9:34:40   0.77 1.09 0.083 0.109
9:34:50   0.69 0.82 0.054 0.078
9:35:00   0.61 0.93 0.056 0.102
61Table A3.1 Panel C. 10-second interval median volatility for the closing minutes 
Range (bps)  R_Range 
Interval  before after before after
15:55:10   4.37 11.45 0.358 0.42
15:55:20   2.08 8.61 ** 0.243 0.552 ***
15:55:30   2.83 5.43 0.312 0.525 *
15:55:40   1.78 10.36 *** 0.212 1.044 ***
15:55:50   2.83 3.76 * 0.283 0.32 *
15:56:00   2.27 2.79 0.236 0.246
15:56:10   2.87 4.64 * 0.329 0.343
15:56:20   2.68 3.9 0.355 0.371
15:56:30   2.37 5.02 0.249 0.47 *
15:56:40   2.35 3.82 0.297 0.261
15:56:50   2.81 4.67 0.312 0.37
15:57:00   4.69 3.45 0.286 0.307
15:57:10   2.65 3.6 0.28 0.26
15:57:20   2.83 4.87 * 0.28 0.341
15:57:30   2.78 3.99 * 0.315 0.359
15:57:40   4.47 4.28 0.453 0.334
15:57:50   2.4 6 0.255 0.389
15:58:00   2.1 3.34 0.304 0.314
15:58:10   3.28 3.25 0.272 0.22
15:58:20   1.97 4.83 * 0.326 0.393 **
15:58:30   5.05 3.36 0.364 0.298
15:58:40   21.08 3.6 0.407 0.31
15:58:50   3.03 3.63 0.403 0.32
15:59:00   3.65 3.13 0.291 0.322
15:59:10   3.87 5.28 0.322 0.496
15:59:20   6.1 2.81 0.492 0.261
15:59:30   3.67 4.57 0.364 0.363
15:59:40   2.86 3.74 0.306 0.386
15:59:50   3.02 6.5 ** 0.264 0.476 **
16:00:00   8.42 10.56 *    0.874 1.129 **
62Table A3.2  Trading Activity for matched NYSE firms 
The table presents the univariate comparisons of the median volume-related measures, Volume  and
Numtrades, during the one-minute interval for the full sample of matched NYSE stocks during February 
2004 (before) and February 2005 (after), respectively.  Volume is the number of shares traded during each 
time interval.  Numtrades is the number of trades executed during each time interval.  Significance levels 
are computed for the percentage difference (before-after) in mean (medians) using a t-test and Wilcoxon 
two-sided t-test. The 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.  Panel A presents 
the one-minute volume-related measures for the opening and the closing minutes.  Panels B and C 
summarizes the ten-second volume-related measures for the opening and the closing minutes, respectively. 
Panel A. 1-minute interval median values 
Volume (shares)  Numtrades 
interval Before after Before after   
9:26 17384 9005.9 *** 7.25 4.2 **
9:27 18343.7 9036.6 *** 7.6 4.2 **
9:28 18128.6 10154.1 *** 7.66 4.23 **
9:29 17623.8 10043.7 *** 7.56 4.54 **
9:30 17889.5 10081.4 *** 7.63 4.69 **
9:31 20675.8 10166.2 ** 7.8 4.47 ***
9:32 17235.8 11155 ** 7.92 6.35
9:33 13171.4 8996.7 * 7.97 6.16 *
9:34 11250.9 6915.7 ** 6.63 6.07
9:35 9220.7 6381.1 ** 5.49 5.25
9:36 6844.1 5865.5 5.39 5.89
9:37 6896 4545 * 5.37 5.54
9:38 5501 5514.4 5.02 5.86
9:39 5295 4720.5 5.26 5.95
9:40 5018.3 4316.9 5.09 5.72
15:51 6119 6227 6.08 7.07 *
15:52 6084.6 6554 5.89 6.69 *
15:53 7362.5 7068.1 6 7.36 *
15:54 6075.4 6574.5 6.46 7.02
15:55 7032.4 6137.9 6.58 7.15
15:56 6714.6 7753.3 6.46 8.15 **
15:57 7637.4 8299.2 6.65 7.69 *
15:58 8801.8 8255.4 7.16 7.72
15:59 9726.2 10691.8 6.68 8.51 **
16:00 9323.9 11845.8 6.77 10.18 ***
16:01 5870.1 6431.1 1.18 1.11
16:02 16331.5 17708.3 1.57 1.51
16:03 12210.7 11057.5 1.07 1.08
16:04 8568.9 6479.3 0.76 0.66
16:05 6077.7 4295.4 0.56 0.43
63Table A3.2 Panel B. 10-second interval median values for the opening minutes 
Volume (shares)  Numtrades    
Interval  before After before after
9:30:10   16985.3 17937.4 4.8 4.15    
9:30:20   17160.2 16805.4 4.8 3.92 
9:30:30   15618.9 13614.6 4.56 3.74 *
9:30:40   13982.2 13116.4 4.8 3.35 *
9:30:50   13734.4 10057.3 4.55 3.43
9:31:00   13050.3 10176.4 4.38 3.29
9:31:10   12868.9 8988.9 3.87 3.09
9:31:20   10985.1 8005.9 * 3.65 3.02
9:31:30   9662.6 6615.6 ** 3.31 2.83
9:31:40   10171.8 5928.5 *** 3.29 2.71
9:31:50   8969.2 5487.8 ** 3.35 2.81
9:32:00   7595.5 5295.3 * 3 2.76 
9:32:10   7401.4 5377.6 * 2.66 2.78
9:32:20   6954.6 4693.6 2.71 2.59
9:32:30   5929.9 4678.2 * 2.65 2.45
9:32:40   5560.3 4292.5 2.53 2.26
9:32:50   5083.3 3536.1 ** 2.44 2.33
9:33:00   4943.7 3326.7 ** 2.36 2.13
9:33:10   4335.5 3037.7 * 2.39 2.27
9:33:20   3991.5 2949.6 * 2.34 2.15
9:33:30   3426.5 2832.6 2.14 2.21
9:33:40   3218.8 2175.7 2.07 2.02
9:33:50   2629.9 2072 1.94 2.05
9:34:00   2286.6 2173 1.78 1.87
9:34:10   2023.2 1923.1 1.81 1.89
9:34:20   2010.2 1822.2 1.75 1.78
9:34:30   1644.2 1902.9 1.68 1.91
9:34:40   1551.1 1769.9 1.55 1.84 *
9:34:50   1160.1 1683.6 1.5 1.77 
9:35:00   1264.5 1351.6 1.56 1.76 *
64Table A3.2 Panel C. 10-second interval median values for the closing minutes 
Volume (shares)  Numtrades 
Interval  Before after Before after
15:55:10   1050.8 1600.2 1.28 1.64 *
15:55:20   1346.2 1307.9 1.27 1.43
15:55:30   1242.2 1209.1 1.25 1.4
15:55:40   1294.3 1534 1.21 1.44 **
15:55:50   1232.9 1118 1.16 1.27
15:56:00   1079.2 1285.4 1.25 1.46
15:56:10   1296 1620.9 1.28 1.42
15:56:20   1357.2 1483.7 1.16 1.33
15:56:30   1321.7 1230.6 1.25 1.18
15:56:40   1664 1625.8 1.35 1.38
15:56:50   1486.1 1379.2 1.32 1.23
15:57:00   1297.2 1132.5 1.18 1.34
15:57:10   1525.6 1273.9 1.3 1.35 
15:57:20   1561.9 1287.2 1.29 1.46 *
15:57:30   1712.7 1284.3 1.28 1.44
15:57:40   1732.1 1378.7 1.4 1.33 
15:57:50   1739 1580.3 1.4 1.24 *
15:58:00   1447.6 1510.7 1.41 1.32
15:58:10   1618.6 2062.5 1.52 1.51
15:58:20   1644.9 2033.2 1.35 1.47
15:58:30   1631.6 2031.1 1.06 1.44
15:58:40   1862.6 1751.5 1.21 1.42
15:58:50   1727.4 1728.4 1.21 1.44 *
15:59:00   1752.3 1965.3 1.28 1.54 ***
15:59:10   1817.5 2229.2 1.24 1.73 ***
15:59:20   1843.7 2063.5 1.27 1.63 ***
15:59:30   2020.7 2728.9 1.31 1.69 ***
15:59:40   2916.5 3145.3 1.48 1.74
15:59:50   6000.8 4623.6 ** 1.86 1.82
16:00:00   33301.1 34548.7 4.19 4.63 *
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